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MILKY WAY AND ANDROMEDA: PRIVACY,
CONFIDENTIALITY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
This article examines the extent to which the law of confidence
protects private personal information. In the UK, much of the
impetus for greater protection comes from the European
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. How privacy and freedom of
expression are to be balanced either within the law of
confidence or through the development of a new tort of
privacy is a question that has given rise to much discussion in
the courts and elsewhere. Developments in this area are the
focus of this article together with the issue as to whether
similar developments might take place in Singapore.
George WEI Sze Shun*
Diploma in Law (London), LLM (University College London);
Barrister (Inner Temple, London), Barrister (Hong Kong),
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);
Professor of Law, Lee Kong Chian School of Business,
Singapore Management University.
I. Introduction
1 In some two to three billion years, our galaxy, the Milky Way, is
likely to meet its nemesis in the local galactic cluster, the Andromeda. It is
thought that this galactic "mother of all collisions" will occur at a time
when life may still exist on planet Earth. Whether life can survive the
encounter is a matter for speculation. Some have suggested, there is so
much space between the stars, that collisions between actual stars are
unlikely. Even if this proves to be the case, there is no doubting the
incredible gravitational tension that will arise as the two galaxies intersect
and eventually merge or emerge as the case may be. It is clear that neither
galaxy will look the same or feel the same after the event.1
The author is very grateful to the anonymous reviewer for his or her comments on
the submission draft of the article.
1 See John Dubinski, "The Merger of the Milky Way and Andromeda Galaxies" at
<http://www.cita.utoronto.ca/-dubinski/tflops/> (accessed 17 February 2006) and
similarly at <http://www.haydenplanetarium.org/hp/vo/ava/avapages/GO6O land
milwy.html> (accessed 17 February 2006).
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2 Civilisation operates on a dynamic balance between competing
rights, interests and obligations. The balance is always in a state of flux.
Sometimes, small changes will suffice to restore an acceptable
equilibrium. Other times, major developments in how we live,
communicate, work and play will require rather larger changes.
Development of modern information technology is one such example. It
has called into question the copyright balance between rights of authors,
copyright owners, users and the public at large. Authors and copyright
owners plead that new strong rights are needed to restore the equilibrium
in the light of rampant on-line copying and distribution. Users and
readers cry foul: the promise that the Internet will be the information
leveller will ground on the bedrock of new or strengthened rights. No,
what are needed are new exceptions and qualifications to redress the
imbalance. Copyleft, open source software, private use defences are what
is needed: not lengthened terms of protection, obligations concerning
technological measures or rights management information. The ideal is
relatively easy to state (or is it?): a system that encourages and supports
the creation of new works and which protects the financial investment in
commercialisation and which at the same time encourages and supports
access to information and use of works so that knowledge can be built on
knowledge for the benefit of all. How that balance is to be achieved and
whether there is any presumptive priority for some interests over others is
a matter that is keenly debated between interest groups and between
nations. Similarly, the long established social and legal galactic norm or
right, freedom of expression, has never been a universe of its own. It has
always been but one galaxy in the universe of social and legal norms and
rights. One long established counterbalance is the right of an individual
to protect his reputation. If defamation actions are said to carry a
potential chilling effect on free speech, so too, unrestrained freedom of
speech may have a chilling effect on an individual's relationship with the
world at large. What has always been needed is to locate the appropriate
and acceptable balance.
2 The common law is well used to developing qualifications and exceptions to rights.
It accepts that where it is necessary that rights be defined in broad open-ended
terms, qualifications and exceptions become the battleground for fleshing out the
right conferred. Thus, in the case of battery, the tort is defined in relatively broad
and pro-liability terms: the intentional and direct application of force to the body of
another person. The tort is defined in these terms because of the perceived social
importance of the interest protected: the right of self-determination in the context of
bodily integrity. But, even here, this is subject to the rule that contacts which are a
part of the conduct of everyday life are not actionable. Life in a crowded world
would be impossible if all intentional direct physical contacts were actionable. This is
best seen as a qualification built into the fabric of the right protected rather than as a
defence that is based on implied consent. See Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172.
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3 Of late, another right, or is it merely a value, has begun to
interface much more sharply with freedom of expression. That right or
value is privacy. How the social and legal tension between free speech and
privacy is best resolved is the issue that has been much debated in recent
times. But, unlike the future collision between the Milky Way and
Andromeda galaxies, the long existing and building interface between free
speech and privacy, if appropriately balanced, should do much for the
quality of life in this information age. The location of this balance in
England and Singapore is essentially the subject matter of this article.
II. The setting
4 The need to achieve a balance between freedom of expression
and privacy is not new. In their now seminal article published in 1890,
Warren and Brandeis wrote:
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house tops."
... The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle
and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery. ... The intensity and complexity of life,
attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some
retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of
culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual ...
5 The authors argued that what was needed to redress the balance
was a new tort of privacy based on the "right to be left alone"4 More than
3 Warren & Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193 at 195ff
Doubtless, these sentiments would have been greatly appreciated by the American
frontier man, Daniel Boone, who on seeing smoke rising from a chimney on a
distant hill line, is reported to have declared that it was too crowded, prompting him
to move deeper into the wilderness!
4 As suggested by Cooley on Torts (Callaghan and Company, 2nd Ed, 1888) at p 29.
Given the inherent problems of defining privacy, it is not surprising that Warren and
Brandeis concluded with a detailed list of qualifications. These set out the fence posts
for the protected right. These were: (a) publication of material which was of public
or general interest; (b) publication of material that would be covered as a privileged
communication in defamation actions; (c) the requirement of special damage in the
case of oral invasion of privacy; and (d) publication with consent. In addition, it was
suggested that truth and absence of malice were irrelevant on liability issues.
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a hundred years later, Lord Denning MR echoed the 1890 clarion call for
a tort of privacy with his suggestion that:5
[A] ny unreasonable intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude
or into his private affairs is an infringement of his right of privacy.
6 What Lord Denning was suggesting, was the development of a
tort that protected privacy as a high level principle of liability: that there
should be a right of privacy as opposed to mere use of privacy as a policy
factor that might be taken into account in developing or explaining
established causes of action such as the action for breach of confidence in
respect of personal information.
7 Similarly, at the start of the new millennium in Singapore, the
sentiments of Warren and Brandeis found a resounding echo in the High
Court decision of Malcomson Nicholas Hugh Bertram v Naresh Kumar
Mehta. There, in the context of developing a new common law tort of
harassment, Lee Seiu Kin JC explained that increasing urbanisation, the
5 Lord Denning, What Next in the Law (Butterworths, 1982) at p 224.
6 [2001] 4 SLR 454 ("Malcomson"). The defendant was employed as Assistant Vice-
President of the second plaintiff in 2000. The first plaintiff was the Chief Executive
Officer. The employment did not "turn out well" and the defendant resigned about
three months later. Thereafter, for approximately a period of one year, the defendant
made and sent numerous phone calls and e-mails to the first plaintiff. Some of these
concerned requests for reinstatement. Fax messages were also sent as was a bouquet
of flowers. Later, after obtaining the first plaintiffs mobile phone number, some calls
were also made to that number. On another occasion, close to the anniversary of the
death of the first plaintiffs infant son, the defendant sent a greeting card (celebrating
births) to the first plaintiff. Various acts of trespass were also said to have been
committed at the first plaintiffs home. Numerous phone calls and e-mails were also
made to other employees and staff of the second plaintiff. The defendant did not file
his Defence in time. Based on the statements in the first plaintiffs affidavit, the court
found at [30] that:
What emerges ... is a sorry story of a person who, out of either malice or due to
mental instability, had embarked on a course of conduct with such persistence
that he had made life unbearable for the objects of his attention. He had used
physical presence as well as telephone, mail, e-mail and SMS messages - all
forms of communication available in this day and age - to wear out those
people and in the process caused them much annoyance and great distress.
Particularly vicious is the sending of the card with the picture of a baby rattle
close to the anniversary of the death of Malcomson's son.
Viewed from a privacy perspective (right of solitude), some of the interferences
complained of could be dealt with using established torts such as trespass and
nuisance. However, some of the interferences were received by the first plaintiff at a
place where he did not have an interest in land (or a sufficient interest in land) to
support a claim in trespass or nuisance. What was needed, from the plaintiffs' point
of view, was a cause of action that could take the interfering acts (phone calls, e-
mails, sms messages, etc) globally, in short, a tort, which if it did not protect privacy
as a high level principle of liability, covered acts of intentional harassment.
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widespread availability of leisure time and new widely available
communication technology had combined to create a problem which did
not exist before. This was not just the increased opportunity to indulge in
"fantasies" about other people - but also the greatly increased
opportunity to contact and communicate with those persons by SMS, e-
mail or mobile phone calls. The learned judicial commissioner concluded
that:'
But life can be unbearable for the person who finds himself the object
of attention of one who is determined to make use of these modern
devices to harass. That person's mobile phone can be ringing away at all
times and in all places. He may get a flood of SMS messages, which can
now be conveniently sent out by computer via e-mail. His inbox can be
flooded with unwanted e-mail. These communications can be warm
words of adulation or they can be chilling threats to property or
personal safety. The result can range from displeasure to distress to
debilitation.
I do not believe that it is not possible for the common law to respond to
this need. In Singapore we live in one of the most densely populated
countries in the world.
8 This was the setting for the acceptance by the learned judicial
commissioner of a new tort of harassment in Singapore. Whilst privacy
concerns clearly lay at the heart of the decision, it was accepted that any
privacy right was qualified and that:'
There is of course the need to balance the plaintiffs' right to privacy
against Mehta's right to free speech. However the latter right has always
been subject to existing law, eg defamation, sedition ... Freedom of
speech, as with any other freedom, extends to where it begins to
impinge on another person's rights.
9 The attainment of the proper balance between privacy and free
speech in the context of repeated unwanted interferences resulting in
7 Id, at [52] and [55].
8 Id, at [56]. This article will not explore in any depth the arguments for and against a
common law tort of harassment. Neither will it address the scope and limits to be
woven into any such tort. Informational privacy is the main focus of this article. It
should be noted that the Malcomson decision is based on policy considerations and
might be regarded by some as tantamount to judicial legislation. This aside, it is to be
stressed that the existence of a common law of harassment has not yet reached the
Singapore Court of Appeal for consideration. The Malcomson decision was a default
judgment (Defence) and thus Lee Sieu Kin JC did not have the benefit of opposing
counsel's arguments. For a discussion of Malcomson, see Tan Keng Feng,
"Harassment and Intentional Tort of Negligence" [2002] Sing JLS 642.
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emotional distress required, in the Malcomson's court's view, the
development of a new harassment tort.
10 If privacy is beginning to impact on the development of common
law rights and obligations in Singapore, the impact in Europe has been
even more dramatic! The seeds were sown shortly after the end of World
War II with the coming into force of the European Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 ("the
European Convention").10 Article 8(1) sets out the Eurpoean Convention
right of privacy in broad terms. It covers respect for an individual's
private life and family life, his home and correspondence. Article 10(1)
sets out the Convention right of freedom of expression which includes
9 Aside from the Malcomson case (harassment), questions relating to control of spam,
data collection as well as use of camera phones and voyeurism have arisen in
Singapore. At present, there are proposals to introduce a US style "opt out" Anti-
Spam Act in Singapore. See the Infocomm Development Authority-Attorney
General's Chambers' Joint Consultation paper at <http://agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/
agc/jointIDA-AGCConsultation Paper.pdf.> (accessed 17 February 2006). For a
commentary, see Warren Chik, "Proposed Anti-Spam Legislation Model in
Singapore: Are We Losing the War Before Even Starting the Battle?" (2005) 17 SAcLJ
747. In the case of data protection, there are no immediate plans to legislate although
a self-help code of best practice is in place. It is understood that data protection is an
area that will be reviewed as and when necessary. The Infocomm Development
Authority in Singapore ("IDA") explains that in February 2002, the National
Internet Advisory Committee ("NIAC") released a draft "Model Data Protection
Code for the Private Sector" which is modelled on internationally recognised
standards. The IDA and the National Trust Council ("NTC") conducted a public
consultation on the code. The Model Code was then finetuned and released in
December 2002 for private sector adoption. The Model Code is said to be a "generic
code" that is available for adoption by the entire private sector. The Model Code
applies to any private sector organisation that collects and installs personal data in
electronic form, online or offline, using the Internet or any other electronic media.
In the e-commerce area, the NTC has aligned its trust mark programme with the
principles of the Model Code. The "Trustsg" mark is administered by the NTC and is
awarded to on-line traders who meet the NTC standards for sound ecommerce
standards and practices. A copy of the Model Code is available at
<http://www.trustsg.org.sg/pdf/DataProtectionCode-vl.3.pdf> (accessed 1 March
2006). For a recent article supporting data protection legislation for Singapore, see
Vili Lehdonvirta, "European Union Data Protection Directive: Adequacy of Data
Protection in Singapore" [2004] Sing JLS 511. In the case of voyeurism, there are no
immediate plans to legislate although in some cases, existing criminal provisions may
apply such as the offence concerning outraging modesty set out in s 509 Penal Code
(Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed). See also s 29 of the Films Act (Cap 107, 1998 Rev Ed) on the
making and reproduction of obscene films. If the tort of harassment is confirmed,
then in some cases an action for harassment may be available. The Minister for
Home Affairs, Mr Wong Kan Seng, stated in Parliament on 20 July 2004 that the
Government's present view is that the existing laws are adequate to deal with use of
camera phones. In other cases, actions in nuisance and possibly under the rule
established in Wilkinson v Downtown [1897] 2 QB 57 may also be relevant.
10 The European Convention entered into force in 1953.
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the "freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers".
Both rights are subject to broad qualifications that underscore important
aspects of the public interest including the need to balance privacy
against freedom of expression.11
11 It was not, however, until the start of the new millennium that
the UK passed and brought into force legislation to implement the
Convention. The legislation, the Human Rights Act 1998, incorporates
the values and principles of the European Convention into domestic
English law.1 Unsurprisingly, the European Convention and the Human
Rights Act is proving to be a fertile ground for litigation in the UK.13
Many important questions have arisen including: (a) whether there is any
presumptive priority for free speech over rights of privacy; (b) whether
compliance with Arts 8 and 10 requires the development of a cause of
action to protect privacy head on; (c) whether the Art 8 right of privacy
applies not just between individuals and public authorities (vertical
implementation) but also as between one individual and another
individual (horizontal implementation) and (d) if the main vehicle to
carry through Art 8 is the action in equity to protect confidential
information, how that action is best developed or adapted so as to better
incorporate the values set out in Arts 8 and 10. How the English courts
11 For privacy, see Art 8(2):
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
For freedom of expression, see Art 10(2):
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
12 The Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42) (UK) came into force in 2000.
13 These include Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 and Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001]
QB 967; Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2003] 3 All ER 996 (Ch); [2006] QB 125 (CA).
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appear to be dealing with these questions will be considered below.'4 But,
before doing so, some general points on informational privacy will be
explored.
III. What is informational privacy about?
12 Privacy as a social norm is readily approachable even when
couched in broad open-ended terms. But, as a factor to shape the
development of legal rights and obligations and especially where privacy
is advanced as a high level principle of liability, greater precision as to the
scope of the right or values implicated may be necessary. This is not
simply a matter of working out a range of qualifications and exceptions as
these naturally beg the question: What is the right in respect of which the
qualification or exception bites? Given the amorphous nature of a vague
invocation of a right to be left alone in an increasingly crowded world,
not surprisingly, it has been more convenient to think of privacy in terms
of particular aspects of private life. Thus, in Wainwright v Home Office,'1
Lord Hoffmann observed that whilst the US courts have been receptive to
the Warren/Brandeis clarion call for a right to be left alone, it was soon
apparent that "the developments could not be contained within a single
principle" 6 Indeed, the US Restatement of the Law of Torts accepts that
privacy encompasses four related groups of torts that deal with:
(a) unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of another;
(b) the appropriation of another's name or likeness;
(c) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life; and
14 Note that even before the Human Rights Act 1998, the European Convention was
having an important impact in the United Kingdom. Individuals aggrieved by their
failure to find a remedy in domestic UK law to protect their Art 8 rights could always
launch a case at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg against the UK
Government. For example: Malone v United Kingdom [1984] 7 EHRR 14 ("Malone")
(telephone tapping by police in course of criminal investigation), Halford v United
Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523; [1997] IRLR 471 (telephone tapping by employers)
Earl Spencer v United Kingdom (1998) 25 EHRR CD 105 (long lens photography),
Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 719; [2003] EMLR 15 (use of CCTV stills to
publicise benefits of CCTV). In some cases, adverse findings led the UK to introduce
specific legislation to deal with the issue. An example is Malone where as a result of a
finding that Art 8 has been broken (insufficient clarity as to how the discretion to
authorise tapping is exercised) the UK Government passed the Interception of
Telecommunications Act 1985 (c 56) (UK).
15 [2004] 2 AC 406.
16 Ibid, at [16].
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(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false
light before the public.'
13 In England and Singapore, a number of different actions may be
relevant in respect of each category. In the case of intrusion into seclusion
or solitude, trespass to the person (assault, battery and false
imprisonment), trespass to land, nuisance, harassment (statutory or
otherwise) and even the principle in Wilkinson v Downtown'8 (intentional
infliction of nervous shock) may be relevant.'9 In the case of the second
category, the tort of passing off and registered trade mark infringement
naturally take the lead role."0 In the case of the third category, the action
in equity to protect confidential information is the most obvious means
17 See 4 Restatement of the Law of Torts, 2d, 1979. This classification is based on
Prosser's classification. See William Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (West
Publishing Co, 4th Ed, 1971) and now Prosser and Keeton on Torts (West Publishing
Co, 5th Ed, 1984) at p 851 that:
What has emerged is no very simple matter. As it has appeared in the cases thus
far decided, it is not one tort, but a complex of four. To date the law of privacy
comprises four distinct interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the
common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each
represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff "to be left alone."
18 [1897] 2 QB 57.
19 This first category might also be described loosely as "spatial privacy" or the right to
be left alone in respect of quiet enjoyment of one's immediate physical surroundings.
20 Whilst there are difficulties with both passing off and registered trade mark law
(goodwill, likelihood of confusion, distinctiveness and whether the use of the image
or name will be seen by the public as a trade mark use: example Elvis Presley Trade
Marks [1999] RPC 567) remedies are sometimes available even without a broad
publicity right. For a successful English case under passing off, see Irvine v Talksport
Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 414. It might be said that what is at issue here is not so much
privacy as the desire to protect commercially valuable goodwill and marketing
opportunities and that it is unhelpful to think of this category as an invasion of
privacy. See Raymond Wacks, "The Poverty of Privacy" (1980) 96 LQR 73. But, is
there any inconsistency between privacy and the desire to protect commercial
interests? The reality must be that often times, information will be of a hybrid
character: private information that has commercial value. The use of stringent
exclusive licences to protect privacy has been recognised as legitimate and
reasonable. See Douglas v Hello! Ltd, supra n 13, and especially [2006] QB 125 where
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR for the Court of Appeal stated at [ 113] that:
We can see no reason in principle why equity should not protect the
opportunity to profit from confidential information about oneself in the same
circumstances that it protects the opportunity to profit from confidential
information in the nature of a trade secret.
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to protect against unwanted publicity for private facts.' In the fourth
category, defamation and malicious or injurious falsehood are the main
actions that come into play.
14 Informational privacy concerns the third category. As distinct
from false light actions, informational privacy is essentially concerned
with injurious revelation of true but private facts. In some cases, this may
lead to consequential financial losses or nervous shock. Often times the
victim will suffer mental distress, anger, humiliation and emotional hurt
without any psychological injury such as nervous shock.
15 A related area concerns the fabrication of facts which whilst
untrue, are not defamatory in that they do not lead to a lowering of the
reputation of the victim in the minds of ordinary members of the public.
This is an area which sits uncomfortably with the concept of an action to
protect private facts based on the law of confidence. However much the
concept of confidential information is developed to engage privacy
values, privacy in the sense of informational autonomy appears to be
founded on the bedrock of true but personal facts. Stretching the
definition to cover invented facts which interfere with a person's private
life may so greatly distort the action as to suggest that what is happening
is the creation of a new tort to protect privacy per se, the right to be left
alone, head on. Whether the law needs to go so far is a matter on which
differing views will arise. But, there is likely to be agreement that even if
stronger control is needed in this area, the answer is not to be found in
the law of confidence however much that law is "tweaked" to incorporate
21 Wacks, supra n 20, asserts that the law of confidence is inadequate because of its
insistence on a relationship of confidentiality. Invasions of privacy often times will
take place without there being any relationship between the parties. Whilst this is
clearly so, there can be no doubting that unwanted publicity for private facts is fast
becoming the most important area of the privacy debate. If a new tort of privacy is
undesirable, the best way forward to accommodate privacy values in this category
will be to develop the action for breach of confidence. This is considered below.
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privacy values.22 In his 2003 Presidential Address to the Bentham Club,
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR used as an example of how far
privacy laws can reach, the Constitutional provisions in Germany that
mandated that human dignity was "inviolable" and that "everyone has a
right to the free development of his personality, insofar as he does not
injure the rights of others or violate the constitutional order or the moral
law". On this basis, Lord Phillips MR noted that German law was willing
to provide a remedy where a defendant published a fictitious but non-
defamatory account that nevertheless encroached on the victim's right to
personality."
16 Given that the Prosser/US Restatement of Torts third category
concerns public disclosure of embarrassing facts, what is the spirit that
supports the assertion that legal liability must follow closely behind, even
when the only injury is embarrassment, anger, mental distress or
humiliation? As the Shakespearean tragic hero Hamlet once pondered:
24
To be, or not to be: that is the question:
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them?
22 Note that where actual damage is caused by the invention of untrue (but not
defamatory facts), such as loss of a job or a failure to secure a job, an action for
injurious falsehood may be available. The person relying on the false statement to his
detriment might also have an action in deceit. It has also been suggested that in
appropriate cases, an action in negligence might be available (negligent
misstatement). Problems may arise, however, as to whether there is a sufficient
relationship between the parties to generate a duty of care and further whether
negligence is appropriate where the false statement was intentionally made with
knowledge of the falsity. On the other hand, if this problem is correctly categorised
as implicating privacy values, then liability should flow and a remedy should become
available for false non-defamatory statements that cause mental distress or anger and
humiliation. But to achieve this (assuming that it be thought desirable), a new tort of
privacy will be needed.
23 Lord Phillips MR, "Private Life and Public Interest", 2003 Presidential Address to the
Bentham Club, University College, University of London. A copy of the address can
be found posted at: <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/alumni/presidents/docs/
phillips_03.pdf> (accessed 17 February 2006). The German case referred to
concerned publication of a fictitious interview with Princess Caroline of Monaco
reported at BGH 15 November 1994, BGHZ 128,1416. How would such a case be
dealt with in England or Singapore? In some cases where the false statement has the
effect of depriving the victim of an opportunity to sell a story, an action for
malicious falsehood might be available. See Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62.
24 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 1, lines 56-60.
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17 Stoics may reason that the slings and arrows of outrageous
behaviour are part of the deal that comes with living in an ever more
crowded urbanised world. Boorish behaviour, bad manners, idle curiosity
and informational voyeurism are part and parcel of every day life. What is
needed is thicker skin, not the taking up of legal arms against a sea of
irritants and the development of mega torts that greatly expand the area
of liability. Consider the related but distinct area covered by the rule
established in Wilkinson v Downtown.'5 Attempts (unsuccessful) to
expand liability to the intentional or reckless infliction of mental distress
were met by the following counsel from Lord Hoffmann:"6
In institutions and workplaces all over the country, people constantly do
and say things with the intention of causing distress and humiliation to
others. This shows lack of consideration and appalling manners but I
am not sure that the right way to deal with it is always by litigation ...
The requirement of a course of conduct [in respect of the statutory tort
of harassment where mental distress damages are available] shows that
Parliament was conscious that it might not be in the public interest to
allow the law to be set in motion for one boorish incident. It may be
that any development of the common law should show similar caution.
18 What is needed is the striking of a reasonable balance. In the area
of spatial privacy (physical seclusion or solitude), the torts of trespass to
land, nuisance and the rule in Wilkinson v Downtown have fallen short of
the mark where mental distress is caused to a non-owner victim. The
response has not been to carve out a blockbuster mega tort that can cover
even single acts giving rise to mental distress - however boorish that
behaviour might be. Instead, the balance in England is now to be found
in the statutory tort of harassment with its requirement of repeated acts
of interference (course of conduct) balanced off with a slate of defences
including reasonableness of the conduct.
19 In Singapore, a similar judge-driven common law tort of
harassment has established a tentative foothold in the legal landscape. If
confirmed, close attention will be needed on the details of the action:
Must the course of conduct be unreasonable and if so, is this a matter of
defence or a point in establishing a case against the defendant? In
England, it appears that reasonableness is structured as a defence. Some
may argue with force, that the burden should fall on the victim's
shoulders to prove that the conduct was not simply repetitive but also
unreasonable in all the circumstances. Indeed, given the broad policy
25 Supra n 18.
26 Wainwright v Home Office, supra n 15, at [46].
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choices that have to be made in crafting the details of the rule of liability
and the range of defences, might it not be better for harassment to be
developed by legislation in Singapore?
20 Similar issues arise in the area of informational privacy. Even if it
is felt that the law will be more coherent and approachable with an
independent tort of privacy, tricky, but familiar questions as to the role of
judge-made law and Parliament arise. Who should take the lead? In their
seminal article on a right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis entertained no
doubts as to the suitability of this area for case law development. In
tracing through the evolution of a variety of pigeon-holed actions whose
common principle was said to be privacy (nuisance, defamation, trade
secrets, etc), the authors commented that:2 7
This development of the law was inevitable. The intense intellectual and
emotional life, and the heightening of sensations which came with the
advance of civilization, made it clear to men that only a part of the pain,
pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions,
and sensations demanded legal recognition and the beautiful capacity
27 Supra n 3, at 195. In an attempt to forestall criticism, the authors later argued at 213
that the application of an existing principle to a new state of facts was not judicial
legislation. The existing principle behind the pigeon holes was said to be privacy.
But, whilst a strong case can be made for arguing that privacy is one of the values
protected by the identified causes of action, this is not the same as stating that
privacy is the governing principle of liability. But, Warren and Brandeis had no
difficulty with this, arguing at 213 that judicial legislation was not in any case
necessarily a bad thing and that:
[T]he elasticity of our law, its adaptability to new conditions, the capacity for
growth, which has enabled it to meet the wants of an ever-changing society and
to apply immediate relief for every recognized wrong, have been its greatest
boast.
In support, the authors cited 1 Austin's Jurisprudence, p 224 that in all countries, that
part of the law made by judges has "been far better made than that part which
consists of statutes". Writing almost 100 years later, Lord Denning MR would have
likely agreed, given his statement that "[t] here is no obstacle in the way of the judges.
It is open to them to find - as the courts of the United States have found - a new
tort. English law should recognise a right of privacy": Lord Denning, What Next in
the Law, supra n 5, at p 267. Similarly, whilst Sir Robert Megarry VC denied a tort of
invasion of privacy in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344
("the Malone case"), he was prepared to say at 372 that the absence of prior authority
was not conclusive:
[T] here has to be a first time for everything, and if the principles of English law,
and not least analogies from the existing rules, together with the requirements
of justice and common sense, pointed firmly to such a right existing, then I
think the court should not be deterred from recognising the right.
The approach and decision of Lee Sieu Kin JC in Malcomson, supra n 6, would find
support in such views. Indeed, Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 and the
development of negligence out of pigeon-hole categories of liability also come to
mind. An analogy expressly referred to by Sedley L in Douglas v Hello! Ltd
(interlocutory appeal) [2001] QB 967 at [109].
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for growth which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to
afford the requisite protection, without the interposition of the
legislature.
21 The boundary between what might be termed "revolutionary
developments" as opposed to "evolutionary changes" has never been an
easy one to pin down. Few will doubt that judges and the courts must
have the right or power to develop established legal principles on the time
honoured "case-by-case" basis. Through the taking of small steps, by way
of evolving an established action on the basis of case analogy, is how
much of the common law was developed. Revolutionary developments,
on the other hand, are a different matter. These tend to involve areas of
broad social and economic policy and less of case-by-case analogy.
Inevitably, the boundary is unclear. Case-by-case, step-by-step
development generally leads to greater clarity and coherence. The
establishment of new causes of action on the back of policy (as opposed
to close case law analogy) by way of contrast is said to open the door to a
period of uncertainty. After all, in many cases the elements of a new
action will be carved out in broad terms. Exceptions may be unclear as it
will take time and many cases to work out the ambit of the action and the
full range of conflicting policies. In the area of privacy, there can be little
doubt that the development of a new "blockbuster" tort that protects a
free-standing right of privacy will be highly controversial.8 Numerous
interests on both sides of the divide will be implicated, leading Lindsay J
to conclude that:"
28 But see Sedley LJ In Douglas v Hello! Ltd (interlocutory appeal), supra n 27, to the
effect that English common law had developed to the point where it would recognise
a right of personal privacy.
29 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2003] 3 All ER 996 at [229]. In a similar vein, see Kaye v
Roberston, supra n 21, especially Glidewell LJ and Bingham LJ; and also Buxton LJ in
Wainwright v Home Office [2002] QB 1334. On appeal to the House of Lords in the
latter case, Lord Hoffmann, supra n 15, at [33] agreed with the observations of
Megarry VC in the Malone case, supra n 27, that "this is an area which requires a
detailed approach which can be achieved only by legislation rather than the broad
brush of common law principle". See also Joshua Rozenberg, Privacy and the Press
(Oxford University Press, 2004) at p 32 that the "judicial threat to legislate" in the
area of privacy has been criticised by Lord Irvine of Lairg LC. Rozenberg reports that
the Lord Chancellor in June 1996 stated to the House of Lords that English law did
not recognise a general right of privacy and that in response to the question, should
judges make one, his view was that only if "there were a clear consensus - and I am
sure there is none - then I say that if judges invented a law of privacy they would
seem to be taking sides". In Singapore, Tan Keng Feng, supra n 8, at 646 argues
against a common law of harassment stating that:
If harassment is a serious problem in Singapore, developing a new tort with its
proper scope and relevant defences under the common law takes too many
cases and too much time, apart from being against the scheme of the
development of tort liability so far ...
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So broad is the subject of privacy and such are the ramifications of any
free-standing law in the area that the subject is better left to Parliament
which can, of course, consult interests far more widely than can be
taken into account in the course of ordinary inter partes litigation. A
judge should therefore be chary of doing that which is better done by
Parliament.
22 In England, the problem is compounded by the fact that
successive governments and parliaments have generally been reluctant to
intervene in the area of privacy. Whilst specific statutes have been passed
which deal with particular aspects of privacy (such as the Protection of
Harassment Act and Data Protection legislation), there is a perceived
reluctance to introduce a general statutory action covering invasions of
privacy." That being so, it comes as no surprise to find that few English
judges have been prepared to go so far as to support a new tort protecting
privacy head on. Instead, as will be discussed later, the dominant view is
that even with the Human Rights Act 1998, all that is needed is to
recognise that the values of privacy and freedom of expression are to be
woven into and treated as part of the fabric of established causes of
action, including the action in equity to protect confidential
information."
23 The values protected by rights to informational privacy or
informational autonomy have been described in various terms. Self-
determination, dignity, esteem, respect, emotions and feelings have all
been used to describe the central core of the concept. These are the values
that underscore individuality and all that flows from a society that
encourages individuality and creativity. Privacy, it has been said, allows
the development of relationships between individuals and the fostering of
trust. Beyond this, some commentators have suggested that privacy
creates the conditions necessary for engagement in experiments in living.
Privacy empowers the individual to develop his own character by giving
him a protected area of space. It also allows the individual to edit his
character and to decide to whom he is prepared to share personal
30 See Lord Phillips MR, "Private Life and Public Interest", supra n 23. Lord Phillips
citing remarks of Lord Irvine LC and the position taken by the UK Government in
Earl Spencer v United Kingdom, supra n 14, takes the position that there are clear
indications that the Government was leaving it to the judges to use the tool of the
Human Rights Act to build a law of privacy on the foundations of the law of
confidentiality.
31 Lord Phillips MR in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125, however, states at
[53] that he did not find the shoehorning of privacy into the law of confidence a
satisfactory approach. By saying this, Lord Phillips MR appears to support the
development of a new tort of privacy whether by the judges or by Parliament.
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information with)2 But why should there be a right to edit true facts?
Would such a law be a gateway to protecting misrepresentation, fraud and
other criminal conduct? Surely not, for the most enthusiastic privacy
supporter would also underscore the need for appropriate defences
covering the public interest especially in areas of investigation of criminal
misconduct and the like. Outside of those cases where a public interest
exception applies, it is said that an individual needs a right of
informational privacy so as to allow him to develop relationships with
others on an individual and personal basis.
24 Viewed in this manner, informational privacy is not just a
concept that interfaces with free speech. Informational privacy facilitates
free speech by giving the individual the right to decide to whom and
when, if ever, he wishes to speak. Informational privacy can be seen as a
means of facilitating free speech. In this way, informational privacy and
free speech are not galaxies on collision course - they are simply different
aspects of the one and same galaxy. If this is so, constitutional provisions
on free speech may provide a basis for high level recognition of privacy.
This may be important for countries such as Singapore whose
Constitution does not set out an express right of privacy. Even though
Singapore does not have at present specific legislative provisions on
privacy such as those found in the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and
Art 8 of the European Convention, it is possible that privacy can be seen
as a value that is woven into the provisions safeguarding free speech."
Free speech and freedom of expression are broad open-ended concepts
that must be assessed by reference to qualifications and exceptions. Thus
in X Pte Ltd v CDE,34 Judith Prakash JC (as she then was) rejected an
argument that the action for breach of confidence was inconsistent with
the Constitutional free speech provisions set out in Art 14(1)(a) of the
32 See the excellent summary of "what privacy seeks to do" set out in N W Barber, "A
Right to Privacy?" [2003] PL 602 at 604. See also the case of Von Hannover v
Germany (No 59320/00) 24 June 2004 decision of European Court of Human Rights
available at <http://www.echr.coe.int> (accessed 17 February 2006) and also
reported at [2004] EMLR 21, where private life was said at [50] to include "a
person's physical and psychological integrity ... intended to ensure development,
without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations
with other human beings".
33 Singapore Constitution, Part IV sets out provisions on fundamental liberties. These
deal with liberty of the person, prohibition of slavery and forced labour, prohibition
of retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, rights to equal protection,
prohibition of banishment, rights of freedom of movement, freedom of speech or
expression, assembly and association, freedom of religion and rights in respect of
education.
34 [1992] 2 SLR996.
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Singapore Constitution. At the time the Singapore Constitution was
adopted, there was already a law in force in Singapore relating to
confidence as part of the common law. That common law was not
overridden by the free speech provisions.36 If the vehicle for safeguarding
informational privacy is the action for breach of confidence (as opposed
to a new stand-alone tort), it must follow that confidentiality or privacy
actions will not be inconsistent with the Singapore Constitution." An
obligation to protect confidential or private information can be seen not
just as a legitimate restriction on free speech. It can be seen as a feature of
free speech itself to be given the same general priority as other aspects of
free speech.38
35 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed). The current version of the
Constitution is the 1999 Revised Edition.
36 This was because Art 162 of the Constitution expressly preserved all existing laws.
This would include the common law in so far as it was in operation in Singapore at
the time the Constitution was adopted. That being so it was not necessary for
Parliament to pass a written law on breach of confidence. The point being that
Art 14(2)(a) conferred on Parliament the power to derogate from the free speech
provisions.
37 On this it should be noted that many of the early cases on confidential information
concerned personal information of a private nature. This includes the old case of
Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & Sm 652; 64 ER 293 (information set out
visually in etchings concerning private family scenes). Other examples are Lennon v
News Group Newspapers Ltd [1978] FSR573 (marital confidences), Woodward v
Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760 (conduct of pop stars) and Stephens v Avery [1988]
Ch 449 (sexual information). It would not be right to assume that with all the recent
concerns over privacy and the law of confidence that the extension of confidentiality
into the realm of privacy is a recent phenomenon. The fact is that the equitable
action to protect confidential information has never discriminated against
confidential personal information. Whilst it has been accepted that confidential
information does not include trivia or "tittle tattle" it cannot be assumed that
information must have a definite commercial value in order to be protected. Indeed,
if unauthorised use of the information will be viewed by a person of reasonable
fortitude as an affront to dignity, it is hard to see how that information could be
regarded as trivia.
38 See also Eric Barendt, "Privacy as a Constitutional Right and Value, published as ch 1
in Privacy and Loyalty (Peter Birks ed) (Oxford University Press, 1997). Barendt
argues that there is good reason to recognise privacy as a constitutional right and
value even when the concept is set out in broad terms. This includes the important
point that constitutionally entrenched rights and freedoms are helpful in setting out
the values of a society in a way that goes beyond its use in legal disputes. Barendt also
points out at p 12 that one advantage of giving Constitutional recognition to privacy
is that "we do not expect constitutional freedoms to be as precisely defined as we
generally do statutory rights".
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IV. Recent English developments: Turbocharging the law on
confidential information
A. Is there any presumptive priority in favour of freedom of speech?
25 The Human Rights Act 1998 has raised a wide range of issues.
Perhaps, one of the most important issues concerns whether free speech
enjoys any presumptive priority over privacy. If it does, then in marginal
cases where arguments are finely balanced, there will be an expectation
that free speech should prevail. An assertion in favour of presumptive
priority might also have an effect on where the burden of proof is to be
placed: Is it for the claimant to establish that the balance requires
protection on the facts for the asserted right of privacy or is it for the
defendant to show that the balance (possibly assessed by reference to
proportionality) requires free speech to prevail?
26 The majority, indeed close to unanimous, view of the English
courts, is against reading into the European Convention or the Human
Rights Act 1998 any presumptive priority. Freedom of speech and privacy
are equal in importance - although on the facts of any particular case,
one may well prove to be more important than the other. Thus, in
Campbell v MGN Ltd,3 9 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated that:0
The case involves the familiar competition between freedom of
expression and respect for an individual's privacy. Both are vitally
important rights. Neither has precedence over the other. The
importance of freedom of expression has been expressed often and
eloquently, the importance of privacy less so. But it, too, lies at the heart
of liberty in a modern state. A proper degree of privacy is essential for
the well-being and development of an individual.
27 Similar remarks were made in the Campbell case by
Lord Hoffmann, 4' Lord Hope of Craighead 42 and Baroness Hale of
39 [2004] 2 AC 457 ("the Campbell case").
40 Ibid, at [12].
41 Id, at [55]:
There is in my view no question of automatic priority. Nor is there a
presumption in favour of one rather than the other. The question is rather the
extent to which it is necessary to qualify the one right in order to protect the
underlying value which is protected by the other. [emphasis in original]
42 Id, at [113]:
Any restriction of the right to freedom of expression must be subjected to very
close scrutiny. But so too must any restriction of the right to respect for private
life. Neither article 8 nor article 10 has any pre-eminence over the other in the
conduct of this exercise.
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Richmond, 43 and also by various judges involved in the Douglas v Hello!
••  44
Ltd litigation.
28 The only English case which might give rise to some doubts is the
decision of the Court of Appeal in A v B plc.45 This case involved a
prominent football player who was keen to restrain the unauthorised
publication of sexual information arising out of brief extra-marital sexual
liaisons. In an application for interlocutory relief, the court was
concerned with arguments against pre-trial restraint where free speech
was implicated. It will be recalled that Art 8 of the European Convention
sets out a qualified right of privacy. Article 10 sets out the qualified right
of freedom of expression. There is clearly nothing in these two Articles to
suggest any automatic bias in favour of one over the other. The Human
Rights Act requires every public authority to act consistently with the
European Convention. But what of s 12 of the Act? This section applies to
the grant of any relief by the court that might affect freedom of
expression. In the context of pre-trial relief, s 12(3) provides "that no such
relief is to be granted to restrain publication before trial unless the court
is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should
not be allowed". Section 12(4) then states that:
The court must have particular regard to the importance of the
Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings
relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appears to the
43 Id, at [138]:
The parties agree that neither right takes precedence over the other. This is
consistent with Resolution 1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, para 11:
"The Assembly reaffirms the importance of everyone's right to privacy,
and of the right to freedom of expression, as fundamental to a democratic
society. These rights are neither absolute nor in any hierarchical order,
since they are of equal value."
44 [2001] QB 967 (interlocutory appeal) per Sedley LJ at [136]:
Neither element is a trump card. They will be articulated by the principles of
legality and proportionality which, as always, constitute the mechanism by
which the court reaches its conclusion on countervailing or qualified rights. It
will be remembered that in the jurisprudence of the Convention
proportionality is tested by, among other things, the standard of what is
necessary in a democratic society.
See also [2003] 3 All ER 996 (trial) per Lindsay J at [186] that:
Freedom of expression ... as a counter-force to, for example, privacy is not
invariably the ace of trumps but it is a powerful card to which the court must
always pay appropriate respect ...
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, [2006] QB 125, Lord Phillips MR at [82] cited the
House of Lords decision in the Campbell case where there was agreement that "when
article 8 and article 10 are both engaged, one does not start with the balance tilted in
favour of article 10".
45 [2003] QB 195.
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court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct
connected with such material), to -
(a) the extent to which -
(i) the material has, or is about to, become
available to the public; or
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for
the material to be published;
(b) any relevant privacy code ...
29 Two questions arise from s 12. First, how does s 12(3) affect the
standard by reference to which applications for interlocutory relief are to
be determined? As is well known, the House of Lords in American
Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd,46 in an effort to avoid costly mini-trials before
the substantive hearing, held that it was no longer necessary to establish a
prima facie case on liability before an interlocutory injunction could be
granted. Instead, what the claimant had to do was to demonstrate that
there was "a serious question to be tried". Once this had been established,
the court could proceed straight to factors relating to the overall balance
of convenience between the parties, in particular whether damages would
be adequate to safeguard the positions of the claimant and the defendant.
Other factors might also be relevant including the need in some cases to
preserve the status quo. In hard cases where there is no clear preference
either way, the relative strengths of the parties position can be looked at -
at least where one party's case is clearly much stronger.
30 Whilst the sentiments behind the decision in American Cyanamid
are readily appreciable, the case has given rise to some well-documented
doubts. These include whether a higher threshold or a higher degree of
assurance is needed where what is claimed is a mandatory interim
injunction as opposed to mere prohibitory relief.47 The reality is that the
American Cyanamid guidelines are precisely that: guidelines which may
not always have to be strictly applied. On this, there is much to be said in
favour of the observation of Hoffmann J (as he then was) that there is but
one fundamental principle: whether the claim is for mandatory or
prohibitory relief, the court is to take the course that appears to carry the
46 [1975] AC 396 ("American Cyanamid").
47 Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340.
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lower risk if it should eventually be proven wrong. One area where this
principle is especially pertinent is the case where the grant or refusal of
the interlocutory relief is likely to dispose of the whole matter. It has long
been accepted that in such cases, greater attention will have to be paid to
the substantive merits of the action.49 How then does this fit in with the
requirement of s 12(3) that no pre-trial relief is to be granted to restrain
publication unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to
establish that publication should not be allowed? Does this mean that a
higher threshold is required - something more than a serious issue to be
tried but still less than a prima facie case? That this might be so is not
surprising given that a more detailed examination of substantive merits
may already be required where the interlocutory application might prove
decisive. In Imutran Ltd v Uncaged Campaigns Ltd, ° Morritt VC, whilst
accepting that in theory and as a matter of language a slightly higher level
of probability is required under s 12(3), was of the view that in practice
there will be little difference between the two. This view was described by
Lord Woolf CJ in A v B plc as providing "useful guidance".5
48 Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd[ 1986] 3 All ER 772 ("the Films
Rover case"). See also Laddie J in Series 5 Software Limited v Philip Clarke [1996]
FSR 273 that there were no fixed rules so that the relief could be kept flexible and
that whilst the court should be slow to resolve complex questions of law or fact at the
pre-trial stage, it might do so where it was able to form a view of the relative
strengths based on credible evidence already before him. In Singapore, the approach
is similar. American Cyanamid has been applied in many cases including X Pte Ltd v
CDE, supra n 34, on breach of confidence. The observations of Hoffmann J in the
Films Rover case were followed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Chuan Hong
Petrol Station Pte Ltd v Shell Singapore (Pte) Ltd [1992] 2 SLR 729. See also Guardian
Media Groups v Associated Newspapers Ltd (unreported, 14 January 2000, (High
Court) and 20 January 2000 (Court of Appeal)) referred to by Lionel Bently & Brad
Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2004) at
p 1094, where it is said that the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the American
Cyanamid guidelines had a degree of flexibility.
49 In England, see Associated Newspapers Group plc v News Group Newspapers Limited
[1986] RPC 515 and Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Company Limited
[1991] FSR 145. In Singapore, see Remus Innovation Forschungs- Und Abgasanlagen-
Produktionsgesellschaft Mbh v Hong Boon Siong [ 1995] 2 SLR 148.
50 [2002] FSR2.
51 Supra n 45, at [11]. But see Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2005] 1 AC 253, cited by
the Court of Appeal in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 31, at [258] to the effect
that in the light of s 12(3), a claimant seeking an interlocutory injunction to restrain
publication had to satisfy a "particularly high threshold test". But, on the facts of the
case, Lord Phillips MR would have continued the interlocutory injunction on the
basis that the claimants had a strong case that the information in the unauthorised
wedding photographs was private. Aside from public curiosity, there was no public
interest that justified the unauthorised publication.
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31 More recently the House of Lords had an opportunity to clarify
the effect of s 12(3) in Cream Holdings Limited v Banerjee.52 This case
concerned an assertion of the public interest defence and an alleged
misuse of confidential information by a former employee. Was there the
necessary likelihood of a permanent injunction? Lloyd J, in granting the
injunction, stated that whether "it was more likely than not" that a
permanent injunction would be granted, the claimant had established "a
real prospect of success". After an unsuccessful appeal, the matter reached
the House of Lords. There, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead embarked on a
detailed examination of s 12(3). The word "likely" was said to be capable
of encompassing different degrees of likelihood ranging from "more
likely than not" all the way to "may well". That being so, it was important
to set the statutory provision in its proper context. Here, Lord Nicholls
stressed that s 12(3) was born out of fears that application of the
American Cyanamid test would make it too easy to obtain interlocutory
injunctions in privacy-related actions. The principal purpose of s 12(3)
was, he explains:
... to buttress the protection afforded to freedom of speech at the
interlocutory stage. It sought to do so by setting a higher threshold for
the grant of interlocutory injunctions against the media than the
American Cyanamid guideline of a "serious question to be tried" or a
"real prospect" of success at the trial.
32 The defendant naturally asserted that this meant that "likely" had
to bear the meaning of "more likely than not" or "probably" so as to raise
the bar higher than the American Cyanamid level. The House of Lords
disagreed. Lord Nicholls took the point that s 12(3) was a general
provision that applied to all cases of interim prior restraint. As a general
provision it was painted with a broad brush. A fixed threshold standard
of "more likely than not" would not be workable in practice as it would
prevent the court from granting an interim injunction in some cases
where it was obvious that injunctive relief should be granted as a54
temporary measure. For this reason, Lord Nicholls preferred a flexible or
contextual meaning approach. He stated that:5
There can be no single, rigid standard governing all applications ...
Rather, on its proper construction the effect of section 12(3) is that the
court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the
52 [2005] 1 AC 253.
53 Ibid, at [15].
54 Lord Nicholls gives as an example a claimant who has a weak case for confidentiality
but who faces extreme adverse consequences if the information is disclosed.
55 Supra n 52, at [22].
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applicant's prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to
justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the
case.
33 As a starting point, Lord Nicholls suggested that the court should
be "exceedingly slow" to make a prior restraint order where the applicant
had not satisfied the court that he would "probably ('more likely than
not') succeed at the trial". From this starting point, the court would have
to consider whether there were any special circumstances that justified
use of a lesser degree of likelihood such as grave adverse consequences or
"where a short-lived injunction is needed to enable the court to hear and
give proper consideration to an application for interim relief or any
relevant appeal")1
6
34 On this basis, whilst s 12(3) does set out a higher threshold for
prior restraint than American Cyanamid, the flexible standard approach
supports the view that there is no automatic priority as such for Art 10
and freedom of speech.5 Indeed, this point was deeply underscored by
the Court of Appeal in the application for an interlocutory injunction in
the Douglas v Hello! Ltd litigation.58 There, Sedley LJ felt that a simple
"bland" application of ss 12(3) and 12(4) would result, in many cases, in
the denial of the court's temporary protection - effectively giving a
priority to freedom of publication over other Convention rights. 9
Sedley LJ felt that this would be inconsistent with the intention of
Parliament. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires courts to
construe all legislation in a manner that is consistent with the European
Convention. This includes the Human Rights Act itself. Sedley LJ noted
that:
60
The European Court of Human Rights has always recognised the high
importance of free media of communication in a democracy, but its
jurisprudence does not - and could not consistently with the
Convention itself- give article 10(1) the presumptive priority which is
given, for example, to the First Amendment in the jurisprudence of the
56 Ibid. Note that in England, special no prior restraint rules apply in defamation
actions. These have been held to apply notwithstanding s 12 of the Human Rights
Act. See Greene vAssociated Newspapers Ltd [2005] QB 972.
57 Procedurally, of course, the assertion of a higher threshold test where Art 10 is
implicated might be said to build in a bias for free speech. But, as Lord Nicholls took
pains to stress, on the facts of any given application a lesser degree of likelihood of
success at trial may suffice.
58 Supra n27.
59 Ibid, at [135].
60 Ibid.
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United States' courts. Everything will ultimately depend on the proper
balance between privacy and publicity in the situation facing the court.
35 Even more clearly, Keene LJ stated that s 12(3):61
... does not seek to give a priority to one Convention right over another.
It is simply dealing with the interlocutory stage of proceedings and with
how the court is to approach matters at that stage in advance of any
ultimate balance being struck between rights which may be in potential
conflict. It requires the court to look at the merits of the case and not
merely to apply the American Cyanamid test. Thus the court has to look
ahead to the ultimate stage and to be satisfied that the scales are likely to
come down in the applicant's favour. That does not conflict with the
Convention, since it is merely requiring the court to apply its mind to
how one right is to be balanced, on the merits against another right,
without building in additional weight on one side.
36 Returning to the A v B plc decision, the second question under
s 12 concerns the extent to which a general invocation of free speech per
se is helpful outside of free speech to protect specific public interest
matters. Here, Lord Woolf CJ set out an extensive list of guidelines to
assist the courts. One important and controversial guideline relates to the
direction in s 12(4) to pay particular regard to freedom of speech as well
as any public interest for the material to be published. On this,
Lord Woolf CJ chose to deeply underscore the importance of a free
62press:
Any interference with the press has to be justified because it inevitably
has some effect on the ability of the press to perform its role in society.
This is the position irrespective of whether a particular publication is
desirable in the public interest. The existence of a free press is in itself
desirable and so any interference with it has to be justified ...
The fact that under section 12(4) the court is required to have particular
regard to whether it would be in the public interest for the material to
be published does not mean that the court is justified in interfering with
the freedom of the press where there is no identifiable special public
interest in any particular material being published. ... Regardless of the
quality of the material which it is intended to publish prima facie the
court should not interfere with its publication. Any interference with
publication must be justified.
61 Id, at [ 150]. Keene LJ did, however, accept that since it was necessary to pay regard to
the merits, that the effect of s 12(3) was to make prior restraint more difficult. Under
English law, this would not be a novel result as is demonstrated by English
defamation cases.
62 Supra n 45, at [I I].
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37 Even though Lord Woolf CJ was not saying that there is
presumptive priority for free speech, the heavy underscoring of the
importance of the defendant being a news organisation inevitably will
mean that claimants face an uphill task. Indeed, the 12th Guideline
propounded by Lord Woolf CJ goes further and states that whilst even
public figures are entitled to privacy (in appropriate circumstances)>'
The individual, however, should recognise that because of his public
position he must expect and accept that his actions will be more closely
scrutinised by the media. Even trivial facts relating to a public figure can
be of great interest to readers and other observers of the media ... The
public figure may hold a position where higher standards of conduct
can be rightly expected by the public. The public figure may be a role
model whose conduct could well be emulated by others. He may set the
fashion. The higher the profile of the individual concerned the more
likely that this will be the position. Whether you have courted publicity
or not you may be a legitimate subject of public attention. If you have
courted public attention then you have less ground to object to the
intrusion which follows. In many of these situations it would be
overstating the position to state that there is a public interest in the
information being published. It would be more accurate to say that the
public have an understandable and so legitimate interest in being told
the information. ... The courts must not ignore the fact that if
newspapers do not publish information which the public are interested
in, there will be fewer newspapers published, which will not be in the
public interest.
38 These guidelines place considerable emphasis on free speech and
the role of the press as the main vehicle for venting public free speech.
Has the pendulum now swung too far in favour of free speech at the
expense of privacy and other counterbalancing rights? Is the commercial
profitability/viability of a newspaper on its own a sufficient or significant
reason for allowing free speech to prevail? If so, is there a danger that
effectively free speech - especially where the defendant is a news agency,
has become the ace of trumps?
39 Public interest has long been established as the main defence in
actions for breach of confidence. Application of the defence has always
required a balancing of the public interest said to justify the unauthorised
use of confidential information and the interest that the claimant has in
maintaining the duty of confidence. In this context, it has been accepted
that the balance is not between a public interest of the defendant and the
private interest of the claimant. Instead, what the law is seeking is a
63 Ibid.
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64balance between two different facets of the public interest. Even more
significantly, Stephenson LJ took the position that there was considerable
difference between information which was merely interesting to the
public and information which should be made known in the interests of
the public. The public interest defence was and is not a "gossiper's
charter" and the interest of media organisations in publishing what
appeals to the public and in increasing circulation or viewers is not
necessarily the same as the public interest.
65
40 Unsurprisingly the remarks of Lord Woolf CJ have proved
controversial. Even journalists have queried whether the case had been
66
overstated. The comparison to be drawn for the purposes of the
balancing exercise in the context of the public interest defence is not
between some abstract concept of public interest but between the specific
public interest that is said to be relevant and any specific policy reasons
that might be relevant to underscoring of the claimant's right of privacy.
Lord Woolf on the other hand suggests that even where there is no
specific public interest reason that might justify unauthorised
publication, the general claim to free speech and a free press may be
sufficient, or at least a significant factor, in deciding where the balance
lies. If this means no more than to say privacy claims must always be
64 Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526 per Stephenson LJ.
65 See also Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 892 where Sir John
Donaldson MR repeated Lord Wilberforce's observation in another case that the
media are apt to confuse the public interest with their own interest. The case referred
to is British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096. See also the
observations of Jacob I (as he then was) in Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [1999]
RPC 655 that the defence was not of wide scope and would only succeed where no
right thinking member of the public would quarrel with the result.
66 See Rozenberg, supra n 29, at p 57 that there was a fear that the balance was so far
tilted in the direction of the press that the Government would come under pressure
to legislate. The author is a trained lawyer and is the legal editor of the Daily
Telegraph and an Honorary Bencher of Gray's Inn.
67 See In re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 AC 593 per
Lord Steyn, who after referring to the Campbell case, supra n 39, states at [ 17]:
What does, however, emerge ... are four propositions. First, neither article has
as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two
articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the
specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the
justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into
account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For
convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test.
For a description of the proportionality principle, see Rozenberg, supra n 29, at p 94
that "this principle derived, originally, from nineteenth century Prussian law and
developed subsequently by the Human Rights Court - requires there to be a
reasonable relationship between a particular objective to be achieved and the means
used to achieve that objective". Put in a different way: The end, however laudable,
will not justify all means to achieve that end result.
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balanced against the Convention right of free expression, then the
guidelines are less controversial. To that end, it is worth pointing out that
this was the interpretation taken by Lord Phillips MR in the subsequent
Campbell litigation. Lord Phillips, after quoting the same passage,
explained that when Lord Woolf stated that the public had an
understandable and legitimate interest in being told information,
including trivial facts about a public figure (in the name of free speech),
he was not speaking of private facts which a fair-minded person would
consider it offensive to disclose and that:68
For our part we would observe that the fact that an individual has
achieved prominence on the public stage does not mean that his private
life can be laid bare by the media. We do not see why it should
necessarily be in the public interest that an individual who has been
adopted as a role model, without seeking this distinction, should be
demonstrated to have feet of clay.
41 That different public interest issues carry a different weightage or
importance is obvious: there will always be a sliding scale. At the very
high end will be information concerning serious specific criminal
misconduct or acts of terrorism and the like. At the lower end may be
information that a public figure has been economical with the truth as to
his or her virtues. How serious that failing will be judged to be must
depend on the specifics of each case, such as the nature of the public
prominence (politician, trustee, community leader, judge, educator,
through to pop stars and sports stars and the like), whether there has
been a deliberate courting of favourable publicity, whether the claimant
publicly claimed the position of role model, the nature of the failing
(dishonesty, sexual misbehavior and so forth) and the nature of the
relationship if any between the claimant and the defendant. At some
point public interest will of course blur into information that is merely
entertaining or interesting. But, then again, just because the information
is "entertaining" does not mean that no public interest can exist that
supports disclosure. There can be no fixed rule as to when the border,
between interesting information and information which the public has a
legitimate interest in receiving, is reached. It must depend on all the facts
68 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] QB 633 at [40]-[41]. But, surely this must in turn
depend on the nature of the prominence, the position that the claimant holds and
the reason why he has feet of clay.
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of the case." Similarly, from the perspective of the claimant, what is
needed is a careful examination of whether there are any specific reasons
as to why the claimants' right to informational self-autonomy is especially
important. In a way, this was what proved determinative in the Campbell
case at trial. There the majority of the House of Lords found that the
claimant's right of confidentiality/privacy had been breached by
revelations of the details of her medical treatment for a drug addiction -
and especially so by the publication of a photograph showing her leaving
a treatment session. That there was a public interest to correct the false
impression that the claimant was not involved in drugs (and therefore a
role model) was accepted. But given the importance to the claimant and
the public at large that she should continue with the treatment at the
clinic, publication of the details was regarded as excessive. The majority
found that it would have been sufficient to meet the public interest
through a revelation that the claimant had taken drugs and was being
treated for an addiction.
42 Thus, it seems that in England, whilst the claimant is under a
duty to establish a case for grant of an interlocutory injunction and whilst
this will inevitably require an examination of the merits and a balancing
of circumstances which underscore privacy and freedom of expression,
there is no automatic priority either way. To be fair, the need to balance
69 Where the information is as much a part of the defendant's life story as the
claimant's, a distinction may be drawn between long-term and transient
relationships. As between husband and wife, for example, marital confidences even
though shared remain protectable even if one spouse wishes to exercise her right of
free speech and to tell her own life story. See Argyll (Duchess) v Argyll (Duke) [1967]
Ch 302 and also Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd, supra n 37. But where the
relationship is purely transitory, such as an illicit affair, the position may be different.
The transient lover who has kissed and now wishes to tell asserts that an injunction
will affect her right to tell her own life story. In such cases, the courts may be slower
to grant interlocutory relief especially in the presence of even relatively weak but real
public interest such as role model arguments. This was the result in A v B plc, supra
n 45. But see Theakston v MGN Limited [2002] EMLR 22 where publication of a
written report (detailing a sexual encounter) was allowed but not photographs of the
activity. The latter was regarded as a gross invasion of the claimant's privacy. See the
observations of N W Barber, supra n 32, at 607.
70 Campbell v MGN Ltd, supra n 39.
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sliding scales on either side of the divide was recognised by Lord Woolf CJ
in his guidelines.
43 The position is likely to be similar in Singapore. Even without a
provision like s 12(3) of the Human Rights Act, it has been accepted that
the American Cyanamid guidelines incorporate a degree of flexibility so as
to allow, in the name of fairness, a consideration of the merits of each
side's case in appropriate circumstances. In some cases, in the name of
fairness, a higher degree of assurance may be needed. However, even
though the Singapore Constitution sets out an express right of freedom
of expression (without mentioning a right of privacy), it does not follow
that freedom of expression enjoys presumptive priority as such. Freedom
of expression must be balanced against qualifications recognised by the
laws of Singapore. This includes the action to protect confidential
information. In any case, as suggested earlier, privacy may be best seen as
an aspect of free speech. In which case, what is required is a balancing of
different aspects of the one right. This is not so dissimilar from the
observation of Stephenson LJ in Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans72 that
application of the public interest defence does not involve resolution of a
conflict between a private interest and a public interest - the balance is
between competing aspects of the public interest.
B. Do the Human Rights Act and the European Convention have
horizontal effect?
44 A second general issue of some importance concerns whether
Arts 8 and 10 have horizontal effect as between individuals in addition to
71 See A v B plc, supra n 45, at [11], on Guideline (vii) that "the weaker the claim for
privacy" the more likely it will be outweighed by the claim based on freedom of
expression. But of course the relative strength of the claim for freedom of expression
needs to be factored in. On this, note that whilst the Court of Appeal had discharged
the interlocutory injunction in the Douglas case (essentially on an adequacy of
damages point), supra n 58, a different Court of Appeal in the substantive appeal felt
that the injunction should have been continued. The information was clearly private
as well as having a commercial value. Lord Phillips MR accepted that even where
there is a strong case for privacy that there may be good reason to discharge the
interlocutory injunction. But this was not such a case There was no specific public
interest to justify publication of the unauthorised wedding pictures. The fact that the
pictures might satisfy public curiosity was not enough - especially as authorised
wedding pictures were to be shortly published. Damages would not be adequate to
compensate for the invasion of privacy and the consequential mental distress. See
supra n 31, at [251]-[259].
72 Supra n 64.
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vertical effect as between public authorities and individuals.7' Naturally,
this was an issue of fundamental importance in both the Douglas and
Campbell litigation. In Campbell v MGN Ltd, the House of Lords, without
deciding the question as to whether the European Convention had direct
horizontal effect, had no doubt that the values enshrined in Arts 8 and 10
were now part of the cause of action for breach of confidence. Further,
these values were said to be as much applicable in disputes between
individuals or between an individual and a non-governmental body such
as a newspaper, as they were in disputes between an individual and a
public authority. The question of direct horizontal effect in a way is also
related to whether there is an obligation to carve out a new tort
specifically to cater for the concerns of Arts 8 and 10. The House of Lords
in the Campbell case did not think this was necessary as the values
underscored by both Articles could be recognised by incorporation into
the action for breach of confidence, an action that is of course applicable
whether the defendant is an individual, a non-governmental organisation
or some public authority.
74
45 More recently, the European Court of Human Rights has come
down firmly in favour of giving effect to Art 8 in relationships between
individuals. In Von Hannover v Germany, a case concerning publication
of unauthorised photographs of Princess Caroline of Monaco, the
European Human Rights Court held that:
[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the
individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it
does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in
addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private and family life.
These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of
individuals between themselves ...
46 The English courts will, of course, have to take the European
Court of Human Rights jurisprudence into account - a fact not lost on
the Court of Appeal in the recent substantive appeal in the Douglas
73 See Gavin Phillipson, "Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common
Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act" (2003) 66 MLR 726; William
Wade & Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law, (Oxford University Press, 8th Ed,
2000) and Jonathan Morgan, "Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: 'Hello'
Trouble" [2003] CL] 444.
74 See Campbell v MGN Ltd, supra n39, especially LordNicholls at [15]-[19];
Lord Hoffmann at [49]-[52] and Baroness Hale at [134]. Similar remarks were made
inA v Bplc, supra n 45, by Lord Woolf CJ.
75 Case of Von Hannover v Germany, supra n 32, at [57].
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litigation. There, Lord Phillips MR accepted that the European Human
Rights Court recognises an obligation on member states to protect one
individual from an unjustified invasion of private life by another
individual and an obligation on the courts of a member state to interpret
legislation in a way to achieve that result. 76 This did not mean, however,
that English law is now bound to give "full direct horizontal effect" since
the values protected by the Articles might be shoehorned into the action
to protect confidential information. The question that remains, is how
this is best accomplished. Can common law and equity act as the fairy
godmother to Cinderella (privacy) and adapt the action so as to better
safeguard privacy and free speech through the law of confidential
information? Can the action be given new clothes to wear? As
Lord Nicholls put it in the Campbell litigation:78
Articles 8 and 10 call for a more explicit analysis of competing
considerations than the three traditional requirements of the cause of
action for breach of confidence identified in Coco v A N Clark
(Engineers) Ltd...
C. Turbocharging the action for breach of confidence
47 Whilst much of the case law developing the action protecting
confidential information concerns commercial confidences and trade
secrets, English common law and equity has never in fact limited the
action to information that has commercial value and which is intended to
be used for commercial purposes. A century before the European
Convention, English common law and equity had already started
developing a law on confidential information that did not draw sharp
distinctions between types of information. What was important was
whether the information was confidential. If so, it did not matter whether
the information was commercial or personal in nature. Indeed, it will be
recalled that some of the very earliest English cases in this area concerned
76 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 31, at [49].
77 Id, at [53] per Lord Phillips MR:
We conclude that, in so far as private information is concerned, we are required
to adopt, as the vehicle for performing such duty as falls on the courts in
relation to Convention rights, the cause of action formerly described as breach
of confidence. As to the nature of that duty ... [t]he court should, in so far as it
can, develop the action ... in such a manner as will give effect to both article 8
and article 10 rights. In considering the nature of those rights, account should
be taken of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. In particular, when considering what
information should be protected as private pursuant to article 8, it is right to
have regard to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
78 Supra n 39, at [19]. Coco vAN Clark (Engineers) Ltd is reported at [1969] RPC 41.
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actions in connection with confidential information whose importance
lay solely in their impact on human dignity and feelings." Nevertheless, it
is fair comment that the vast majority of cases developing the action have
been concerned with commercial confidences. The question now is how
the action is best adapted to better safeguard rights of privacy.
48 The seminal English case often said to lie at the heart of the
modern law on confidential information is the decision of Megarry J in
Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd.8" Three key elements were identified:
the information had to possess the necessary quality of confidence; the
information had to be imparted in circumstances importing an
obligation of confidentiality; and finally, there had to be unauthorised use
of the information to the detriment of the confider. Each of these three
elements has been considered in great detail in a large number of cases.
Some of the areas that might prove especially problematic in the context
of privacy values are summarised below.
79 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; 41 ER 1171. This case is often cited as
laying down the foundations for the development of English law on confidential
information. The case concerned a threatened unauthorised use of visual
information set out in etchings of family scenes. Whilst a variety of theories were
advanced to support the grant of an injunction, Sir Knight Bruce VC in the lower
court, supra n 37, at 698; 313 also noted that the defendant had not just unlawfully
invaded the plaintiffs rights, he had also been guilty of "an unbecoming and
unseemly intrusion ... in breach of conventional rules" and "offensive to that inbred
sense of propriety natural to every man". The defendant's conduct was described as
"a sordid spying into the privacy of domestic life". See also Wyatt v Wilson, cited in
Prince Albert v Strange (1820) 1 H &Tw 1 at 25; 47 ER 1302 at 1311. In Wyatt v
Wilson, Lord Eldon had said "If one of the late king's physicians had kept a diary of
what he had heard and seen, this Court would not in the king's lifetime, have
permitted him to print or publish it." Lord Denning, writing extrajudicially, notes,
"That observation is significant. It is the first instance I know of a right of privacy as
distinct from a right of confidence": see Lord Denning, What Next in the Law, supra
n 5, at p 222. An important side question that arises is whether an action for breach
of confidence/privacy can be maintained or brought after death of the claimant. In
defamation cases, it is established that the dead cannot be defamed. See Margaret
Brazier & John Murphy, Street on Torts (Butterworths, 11 th Ed, 2003) at 484. Given
the intensely personal nature of privacy interests, it may be that a similar rule will
apply in the case of the use of the law of confidential information to protect
personally sensitive (private) information. But, query the dividing line between
business trade secrets/confidential information and confidential personal
information. Even the most personal private details of a celebrity may possess
considerable commercial value whose use has been "sold" or licensed to some third
party commercial organisation.
80 [1969] RPC 41 ("Coco v Clark"). Megarry J based his decision on an earlier Court of
Appeal case: Saltman Engineering Coy Ld, Ferotec Ld and Monarch Engineering Coy
(Mitcham), Ld v Campbell Engineering Coy, Ld (1948) 65 RPC 203 ("Saltman
Engineering v Campbell Engineering").
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(1) Quality of confidentiality
49 By and large this is said to require proof that the information is
not in the public domain in that the information is relatively secret in the
sense that it is not readily accessible to the public.8 ' Whilst this is
primarily a question of fact, numerous guidelines have been developed.
These include:
(a) Information as a whole can be confidential even if
component parts are accessible from the public domain.8
(b) The information alleged to be confidential must be
sufficiently well developed. Whilst the provenance of this
requirement is not exactly clear, it is suggested that the
requirement is as much to do with the need to enable the
defendant to meet the claimant's case as with substantive
principles. Factors relevant to whether the information is
sufficiently well developed include whether the information (if
said to embody a new idea) is realisable in actuality and whether
it has been developed to the point where it acquires some
commercial attractiveness. Ultimately, it is suggested that what is
needed is proof that the information said to be confidential can
be defined with sufficient objective certainty such that the
defendant can understand the case being put to him.3
(c) A good test as to whether information is confidential is
whether it is a product of brain labour and effort (bearing in
81 Coco v Clark, supra n 80. See also in New Zealand, Aquaculture Corporation v New
Zealand Green Mussel Co Ltd (1985) 5 IPR 353 per Prichard J at 379 that:
[I]t is a question of public accessibility, a question of degree - for the extent of
the publicity and the difficulty of acquisition are both matters of degree. If, for
example, the information can be obtained by a member of the public by a
process of reverse engineering or analysis of the plaintiffs product this does not
mean that the information is readily available to the public ... The fact that
there has been publication in an evanescent form ... on a limited scale ... is not,
in itself, sufficient to destroy the quality of confidentiality.
82 Coco v Clark, supra n 80, Saltman Engineering v Campbell Engineering, supra n 80, De
Maudsley v Palumbo [ 1996] FSR 447 and Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd
[1997] RPC 289. Note that whilst the cases establish that information as a whole may
be confidential even though some or all of the component parts are in the public
domain, it does not inevitably follow that the combination of public domain
components will always produce something that is confidential as a whole.
Sometimes, 11 - 1+1 and not even 2!
83 Talbot v General Television Corporation Pty Ltd [1981] RPC 1 and Fraser v Thames
Television Ltd [1984] QB 44. In Singapore, see also Chiarapurk Jack v Haw Par
Brothers International Ltd [1993] 3 SLR 285.
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mind that inventiveness is not required). The more brain effort
that is expended on producing the information, the greater the
probability that the information is inaccessible to the public by
reference to that effort.
(d) Simplicity is no bar and there is no requirement as such
for the information to be reduced to writing or some other
material form. 4
(e) Trivial information or tittle-tattle is not protected.8
(f) Whether the claimant believed that the release of the
information would be injurious to him or harmful to others and
the reasonableness of the belief are important indicators of the
confidentiality of the information.86
50 How well do these points fit a case where the claim is asserted in
respect of personally sensitive information? If the action is to be
successfully developed to better recognise the value of human autonomy
and dignity that is said to underline the desire to protect informational
privacy, a number of points come to mind. First, whilst brain labour and
effort of creating information may be relevant in commercial cases, this
factor should not come into play where personally sensitive information
is concerned. If the effort of the claimant is relevant at all in the context
of personally sensitive information, it is more likely that this will only be
so in terms of the effort that he has taken to protect the privacy of the
information. The greater the steps taken, the more likely that the courts
will be moved to hold that the circumstances were confidential or private
and the less the likelihood that the court might find some form of
implied consent flowing from the conduct of the claimant.
51 Second, the requirement that the information must be
sufficiently well developed also needs to be re-examined at least where the
claim is directed to personally sensitive information. Tests based on
whether the information has been developed to the point where the idea
can be actualised or possesses some commercial attractiveness are clearly
inappropriate. Instead, it is suggested that the enquiry should focus
84 Talbot v GTV, supra n 83 and Fraser v Thames TV, supra n 83.
85 Coco v Clark, supra n 80, Stephens v Avery, supra n 37, and Attorney- General v
Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 ("AG v Guardian Newspapers").
86 Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227.
87 This was recognised by Lord Phillips MR in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 31,
at [55].
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sharply on whether the claimant is able to identify the personal
information that he wishes to protect with reasonable objective certainty.
If successful claims are advanced based on some vague open-ended
description of the information that is said to be "confidential" or
"private'" the chilling implications for freedom of expression will be clear.
52 Third, there is the problematic exclusion of protection for trivia
and tittle-tattle. Whether this exception is based on a lack of quality of
confidentiality or a denial of equitable relief on the basis that equity does
not act in vain, there appear to be few cases where the exclusion has
applied. Will it play a more significant role in cases where the action in
equity concerns personally sensitive information? The fact that personal
information may have no or little immediate commercial value is clearly
irrelevant. As Lord Hoffmann has eloquently put it, human rights law has
identified private information as something worth protecting as an aspect
of human autonomy and dignity - the right to the esteem and respect of
other people.88 But, does this mean that any personal information or
personally sensitive information can be protected irrespective of its
nature and the circumstances in which protection is claimed? These are
not easy questions to resolve. In England, there appears to be a building
consensus that the description of information about an individual's
private life as confidential is "not altogether comfortable" and that "[t]he
essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private
information"89 The shift from "confidential" to "private" information is
not simply a matter of changing labels; it appears to herald a real shift in
scope - not surprising given the objective to underscore the values
underpinned by Art 8 of the European Convention. As Lord Hoffmann
has said:90
These changes have implications for the future development of the law.
They must influence the approach of the courts to the kind of
information which is regarded as entitled to protection, the extent and
88 CampbellvMGNLtd, supran39, at [50] and [51].
89 Lord Nicholls, id, at [14]. See also Lord Carswell at [165] and Lord Hope at [92]:
The underlying question in all cases where it is alleged that there has been a
breach of the duty of confidence is whether the information that was disclosed
was private and not public. There must be some interest of a private nature that
the claimant wishes to protect ...
Similarly, see Lord Phillips MR in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 31, at [83]
that for the adjective "confidential" one can substitute the word "private". But see
also Lindsay J at first instance in the Douglas case who felt that the matter could be
resolved by applying established principles of the law of confidence, [2003] 3 All ER
996.
90 Supra n 39, at [52].
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form of publication which attracts a remedy and the circumstances in
which publication can be justified.
Of even greater significance, is the view of Lord Phillips MR that private
information "must include information that is personal to the person
who possesses it and that he does not intend shall be imparted to the
general public"3 1 This of course leads to the question: When does an
individual possess personal information such as to generate a right of
control? Is it enough that the information be personal or must there be
some reasonable expectation of control? Whilst the English position on
what amounts to "private" information is still very much a work in
progress, the following points appear to have emerged.
53 Firstly, an exhaustive definition of private information in the
sense of a list of types of information that can be regarded as personal or
private is clearly not possible or desirable."
54 Secondly, the torch-light that illuminates what might be
encompassed, is the value that is said to be underscored by a claim to
privacy: dignity and human autonomy.93 Privacy is therefore more than a
desire to control the use of personal information. 4 However privacy is
defined as a general concept, it will stretch beyond the misuse of personal
information. The action in equity to protect confidential information,
91 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 31, at [83].
92 Such a list would include but not be limited to information on health, sexual
preferences or conduct, religion and beliefs and hobbies.
93 See especially the views of the European Court on Human Rights. Peck v United
Kingdom, supra n 14, at [57].
Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The court
has already held that elements such as gender identification, name, sexual
orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere
protected by Art 8. The Article also protects a right to identity and personal
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other
human beings and the outside world and it may include activities of a
professional or business nature. There is, therefore, a zone of interaction of a
person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of
"private life" ...
See also Von Hannover v Germany, supra n 32, at [50]:
The Court reiterates that the concept of private life extends to aspects relating
to personal identity, such as a person's name ... or a person's picture ...
Furthermore, private life, in the Court's view, includes a person's physical and
psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by Art 8 of the Convention is
primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of
the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings ...
94 Lord Nicholls gives as an example of this, strip -searches. Campbell v MGN Ltd, supra
n 39, at [15]. See also Wainwright v Home Office, supra n 15, where the House of
Lords refused to recognise a general tort of invasion of privacy where the claimant
had been strip-searched in breach of prison rules.
(2006)
18 SAcLJ 1 Privacy, Confidentiality and Freedom of Expression
even when expanded to cover private information, will not be relevant
where the complaint does not relate to misuse of information.
55 Thirdly, whilst an important indicator of privacy is that the
personal information is not already readily available to the public at large,
the concept of private information may be more resilient and resistant to
public exposure than in the case of confidential commercial
information.9
56 Fourthly, a particularly strict view (in favour of privacy) appears
to apply in cases involving photographs, especially where the images are
of an intimate nature. Even if the intimate scene has been described
verbally or in writing to the public, the photograph may still be regarded
as retaining a degree of privacy.96 But just how far this can be taken is
unclear. Where a person is photographed in a public place, this in itself
will not ordinarily be seen as an invasion of privacy." Of greater
significance is any use made of the photograph. Unforeseeably broad
exposure of the images might well implicate an Art 8 right of privacy,
95 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 31, at [ 105] per Lord Phillips MR that:
In general, however, once information is in the public domain, it will no longer
be confidential or entitled to the protection of the law of confidence, though
this may not always be true ... The same may generally be true of private
information of a personal nature. Once intimate personal information about a
celebrity's private life has been widely published it may serve no useful purpose
to prohibit further publication.
96 Theakston v MGN Limitd, supra n 69 (English High Court), D v L [2004] EMLR 1
(English Court of Appeal), Von Hannover v Germany, supra n 32 (European Court of
Human Rights) and especially Lord Phillips MR in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra
n 31, at [105] that:
In so far as a photograph does more than convey information and intrudes on
privacy by enabling the viewer to focus on intimate personal detail, there will be
a fresh intrusion on privacy when each additional viewer sees the photograph
and even when one who has seen a previous publication of the photograph is
confronted by a fresh publication of it. To take an example, if a film star were
photographed, with the aid of a telephoto lens, lying naked by her private
swimming pool, we question whether widespread publication of the
photograph ... would provide a defence to a legal challenge to repeated
publication on the ground that the information was in the public domain.
There is thus a further important potential distinction between the law relating
to private information and that relating to other types of confidential
information.
97 Campbell v MGN Ltd, supra n 39, at [73] per Lord Hoffmann citing the Australian
case of Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001)
185 ALR 1 where Gleeson CJ stated at [41] that " [p]art of the price we pay for living
in an organised society is that we are exposed to observation in a variety of ways by
other people".
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even if the taking of the photograph per se is unobjectionable. This is
especially so if the images are of a highly sensitive nature.98
57 Fifthly, even where there is nothing intrinsically embarrassing
about an image recorded of the claimant in some public setting or the
context in which the photograph is used, privacy may still be implicated
although here the current legal position is far from clear. Will the image
still be regarded as private? English views have tended to be skeptical on
this. In Canada, much may depend on whether the image of the claimant
was only incidentally included in the photograph or whether he or she
was in fact intended to be the main subject.3 In Europe, the recent
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v
Germany,'" however, represents a significant enlargement of the area of
privacy. There, it was held that the publication of photographs of Princess
Caroline of Monaco infringed her Art 8 right of privacy even though the
photographs were taken of her in public places. These showed the
Princess engaged in a variety of private or personal daily activities such as
shopping and horse riding. The photographs did not show her carrying
out any official duties and in this sense showed her taking part in
activities of a private nature. What was important was not whether the
place where the activity occurred were public or private premises, but
whether the activity could properly be regarded as private.1 1 It remains to
be seen how the English courts will interpret and apply the Von Hannover
v Germany ruling on this point.
98 See Peck v United Kingdom, supra n 14, where the European Court of Human Rights
found Art 8 engaged where CCTV images of the claimant carrying a knife
(attempted suicide) in a public place was widely broadcast without the claimant's
consent and without adequate masking of his face. See also Campbell v MGN Ltd,
supra n 39, at [75] per Lord Hoffmann that "the widespread publication of a
photograph of someone which reveals him to be in a situation of humiliation or
severe embarrassment, even if taken in a public place, may be an infringement of the
privacy of his personal information". Note that Lord Hoffmann was also prepared to
accept at [75] that the publication of a photograph taken by intrusion into a private
place might in itself be an infringement even if there was nothing embarrassing
about the picture itself.
99 See Aubry v Editions Vice-Versa Inc [1998] 1 SCR 591.
100 Supra n 32.
101 Once the activity is found to be private, liability for unauthorised publication would
follow subject to any justification based on the public interest. Here, the European
Human Rights Court stressed at [65] that the publication of photographs and
articles simply "to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details
of the applicant's private life, cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of
general interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public". Note
that according to the list of pending cases (ECHR website) before the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (as at 15 August 2005), it does
not appear that the Von Hannover v Germany has been taken on a referral to the
Grand Chamber.
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58 Sixthly, it is unclear whether the issue as to whether personal
information is private is to be resolved solely on the basis of whether the
claimant intended to keep the information out of public view. Whilst
there is some support for this, there is the alternative view that an
objective test must come into play.1"2 In the Campbell case, Lord Nicholls
explained that the "touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the
disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of
privacy" '°" In most cases, the answer will be obvious. In marginal cases,
there is uncertainty as to whether a further test based on whether the
misuse is offensive (or highly offensive) in the eyes of a reasonable person
is permissible or helpful. Courts in New Zealand and Australia appear
receptive to this.1"4 English case law is far more ambivalent. Starting with
the Campbell litigation, different views have been expressed.
Lord Nicholls felt that a test based on whether the misuse was highly
offensive suggested a stricter standard than a mere reasonable expectation
of privacy. The danger was that such a test might bring into play issues
more relevant to the question of proportionality, such as the degree of
intrusion into private life and whether the publication was a matter of
proper public concern. This, it is submitted, is a critical point. Given the
need to balance privacy against freedom of expression, where is the
fulcrum for the balancing exercise to be found? Free expression and free
press advocates will naturally support dovetailing the balancing exercise
into the initial threshold question as to whether there is any information
that can properly be regarded as private. Locating the fulcrum at this
early stage places the duty on the claimant to demonstrate that as a whole
(bearing in mind public interest concerns) the information can properly
be regarded as private. On the other hand, a test that simply asks whether
the information is personal and within the private sphere, postpones the
key balancing exercise to the later stage when the defendant must find
102 Cases that support a broad interpretation based on a heavy underscoring of the
claimant's right to develop his personality include Von Hannover v Germany, supra
n 32 and Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 31.
103 Supra n 39, at [21].
104 See Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, supra n 97, per
Gleeson CJ that the requirement that the disclosure or observation of information or
conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is
in many cases a useful practical test of what is private. See also Grosse v Purvis [2003]
QDC 151 where the Queensland District Court found that a tort of privacy had
developed in Australia capable of covering intrusions which would be considered
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. In New Zealand, see
Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415 and also Hosking v Runting [2003]
3 NZLR 385 (HC) and [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). See also the US Restatement of the
Law of Torts (1977) that the tort of unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of
another is founded on intrusions which are highly offensive to a reasonable person.
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some public interest that might justify the unauthorised use. Lord Hope
was more accommodating. His Lordship, whilst stating that the test is not
needed where the information is obviously private (presumably based on
the views and expectations of a reasonable person), went on to state that
the trial judge could nevertheless ask himself as a check whether the
information would satisfy the highly offensive test! ' Baroness Hale, on
the other hand, stated that an objective reasonable expectations test was
simpler and clearer than "the highly offensive test" that appeared to have
found favour in Australia. Baroness Hale's position also supports the view
that the fulcrum for the key balancing exercise between a reasonable
expectation of privacy and free expression comes after there is a finding
that the information is private. It is here that the Baroness explains that
the countervailing rights of the recipient will often prevail.'06
59 In the Douglas litigation, numerous different views were also
expressed on this issue. At trial, Lindsay J doubted that it was permissible
to ask whether the information was private in the sense that its disclosure
would be significantly harmful. In any case, on the facts, it was not
necessary to examine whether a reasonable person would have found the
unauthorised publication to be highly offensive.' On appeal,
Lord Phillips MR, after citing the various views set out in the Campbell
case, concluded with the general statement already referred to earlier:
private information is personal information which a person possesses and
which he does not intend to impart to the public.' °8 Doubtless, more is yet
to come on the applicability of the offensiveness test to the threshold
question of whether the information is to be regarded as private.
Lindsay J suggests that such an approach would not be consistent with
Coco v Clark.1"' He states that:11
The law at that first stage of the Coco test does not ... in a trade secret
case, raise what would be corresponding issues such as whether the
trade secret in question is truly such as might be turned to great
commercial advantage or with whether its disclosure would be
thoroughly damaging to the claimant's trade.
105 Campbell vMGNLtd, supra n 39, at [96].
106 Id, at [137]. Lord Carswell did not think it necessary in any event to apply the
offensiveness test since the information in question was private information. Lord
Hoffmann did not expressly address this point.
107 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 29, at [189]-[192].
108 Supra n 31, at [83].
109 Supra n 80.
110 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 29, at [189].
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60 But this ignores the subsequent decision of MegarryVC in
Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle."' There, Megarry VC stated that
a relevant factor in deciding whether information is confidential is
whether the claimant has a reasonable belief that the release of the
information will be injurious to him or of advantage to others. Clearly
this factor looks to the reasonableness of the belief that the threatened
misuse will cause real harm. This, it is submitted, is not so far removed
from a test for private information based on whether the reasonable
person would find the threatened misuse offensive or highly offensive.
However, notwithstanding this, there is much to be said for the point that
in the majority of cases, the question as to whether information is private
can be resolved by asking whether a reasonable person in the position of
the parties would regard the information as private. Private or personal in
what sense - in the sense that it can reasonably be regarded as implicating
the claimant's right to dignity, autonomy and personality development. A
common-sense view should prevail. A system of law that chooses to
expand rights of privacy may be slower to incorporate a stricter test at
this threshold stage. But countries where free speech issues loom very
large, such as the US, may be far more willing to develop a law on privacy
by reference to stricter criteria of highly offensive behaviour. Which way
should other countries go? An overly powerful privacy right or an over-
extended law of confidence is not perhaps the best way to deal with the
problem of public curiosity and hunger for interesting stories. Internal
self-regulation, better social education and a thicker skin may be
preferable to a flood of litigation before the courts. A balance is needed. If
it is felt necessary to expand the action for breach of confidence to better
cover privacy, what is wrong with setting the balance in hard cases at
behaviour which a reasonable person would find to be highly offensive?
(2) Relationship and obligation of confidentiality
61 In Coco v Clark,"' the parties dealt with each other in the course
of pre-contractual negotiations. In this context, Megarry J stipulated that
aside from proof that the information possesses the quality of confidence,
it was also necessary to show that the information was "imparted in
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence'" ' Megarry J was
there dealing with a confider and a confidant in the context of consensual
negotiations. The standard of conscionability was once again that of the
111 Supran86.
112 Supran80.
113 Ibid, at 47.
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reasonable person: Would a reasonable person in the shoes of the
recipient have realised on reasonable grounds that the information was
being handed over in confidence?114
62 Much has been written on the nature of the relationship that
generates the duty of confidence in equity. Is the test entirely objective?
Can regard be had to the subjective beliefs of the parties? Is a degree of
recklessness required where the defendant is an indirect recipient of
confidential information? What degree of knowledge or notice is needed
to affect the conscience of remoter recipients? Can a duty be imposed
where the information though confidential was unsolicited? What if the
defendant was a mistaken recipient? Whilst these are important
questions, irrespective of the nature of the confidential information
(commercial or private), there is one question that will likely be of critical
relevance in the area of private personally sensitive information. This
concerns the position of a defendant who acquires the information in the
absence of any prior relationship with the claimant. An invasion of
informational privacy will often occur without the claimant being in any
prior relationship with the defendant. The defendant will be a deliberate
taker as opposed to a mere "recipient" of information. In some cases,
illegal means may have been used to acquire the information; in other
cases the defendant may not have used means overtly illegal in themselves
as where a long lens is used from far off to photograph the claimant
walking in her own garden. An insistence that there be a giving and a
receipt of the information would clearly have greatly limited the scope of
the action in equity. But here, the law has moved on. In the area of
industrial/commercial espionage, equity may be able to intervene pro-
actively, so to speak, and to impose a duty of confidence in the absence of
any prior relationship. Different theories might explain such an
intervention: from property-based theories to liability based on
reprehensible, improper or in some cases the use of illegal means to
acquire the information."' Indeed, English cases have for some time
suggested that a duty or obligation of confidence can arise by law,
whenever a person receives or acquires information which he knows or
114 Id, at 48. Note that Megarry J also considered a test based on the officious bystander
of contract law - not surprising given that the parties were in a near contract
situation. But on balance, it appears that the reasonable man approach dominated
his approach.
115 George Wei, "Surreptitious Takings of Confidential Information" (1992) 12 LS 302;
Megan Richardson, "Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained
Information and Privacy: Theory Versus Law" (1994) 19 MULR 673. In the US,
there is strong support for liability where reprehensible means are used: E I duPont
deNemours & Co v Christopher 431 F 2d 1012 (1970).
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ought fairly to know is confidential."6 This has led Lord Nicholls in the
Campbell case to observe that "[t]his cause of action has now firmly
shaken off the limiting constraint of the need for an initial confidential
relationship"'11' In the context of confidential private information, the
touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the disclosed facts the
person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy. If so, then if
the defendant knew or ought to have known of the reasonable
expectation of privacy, a duty of confidentiality/privacy will arise."'
63 From this it can be seen that in respect of both the first and
second elements of the action to protect confidential personal
information, the most important question is whether the claimant had a
reasonable expectation in the actual circumstances that the privacy of the
facts would be respected. Once this is found in his favour, the
information will be regarded as having the quality of privacy and so long
as the defendant knew or ought to have known of this, he will be under a
duty of confidentiality/privacy. This development of dispensing with the
need to establish some prior relationship, which in fact pre-dates the
Human Rights Act 1998, more so than any other change, has opened the
door to a more aggressive application of the law of confidence to protect
privacy interests.
(3) Unauthorised use and detriment
64 In the vast majority of cases, whether there has been an
unauthorised use is largely a question of fact although nice issues of law
have arisen in the past concerning the position of subconscious use and
whether the use must result in the taking of an unfair advantage. In the
116 Lord Goff inAG v Guardian Newspapers, supra n 85, at 281.
117 Supra n 39, at [14].
118 See also Lord Hoffmann, id, at [48], that the view that there is no need any more for
a prior confidential relationship has been accepted as representing current English
law by the European Court of Human Rights in Earl Spencer v United Kingdom,
supra n 14 and also the Court of Appeal in A v B pc, supra n 45. Similarly,
Lord Hope in the Campbell case was of the view, at [85], that the need for a duty of
confidence does not give rise to any problem as a duty will arise "whenever the party
subject to the duty is in a situation where he knows or ought to know that the other
person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected". Similar views were
expressed by the other House of Lords judges in the Campbell case. Likewise in
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 29, Lindsay J, whilst prepared to apply Coco v
Clark, supra n 80, to the facts before him, stated at [186] that if there was an
intrusion in a situation in which a person could reasonably expect his privacy to be
respected, then that intrusion would give rise to a duty of confidence. A duty of
confidence in personal confidence cases will have to be inferred from the facts. On
appeal, Lord Phillips MR likewise adopted a similar approach, supra n 31.
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context of private personal information, what adjustments if any might
be needed to adapt the action to the demands of Art 8? A few points come
to mind. To begin with, in the vast majority of cases where private
personal information is involved, the defendant is likely to be a taker of
the information. In such cases, any use will be unauthorised. Thus, once
there has been a finding that the claimant did have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in respect of the facts, the question as to whether
any use is unauthorised is unlikely to cause any further difficulties. In
cases where the defendant is given confidential information by a
defaulting intermediary, the use of an opportunity revealed by the
information to further spy on the claimant, such as by taking a
photograph of the claimant, may in itself amount to an unauthorised
use."' In other cases, the mere taking of the photograph might not
amount to misuse, but any publication of the images might result in
liability.1"0 Whether a defendant who merely photographs a person in a
private place for use of the image for his or her own private gratification
will be liable is also now open for consideration. Will the claimant have a
reasonable expectation of privacy against "private use" by the defendant?
If the Australian/New Zealand/US approach of "highly offensive"
behaviour is the litmus test, will a reasonable person find such private but
limited use highly offensive? Whilst much will depend on the facts, it will
not be surprising if an affirmative answer is forthcoming in some cases."'
65 There is lingering uncertainty over whether detriment is needed
to constitute an action for breach of confidence. At one level, the debate is
whether the claim is actionable per se or one that is only actionable on
proof of special damage. At another level, there is the important question
as to whether detriment includes non-economic losses such as grief,
vexation and mental distress. Further, what if the detriment is suffered by
a third party? This, perhaps, was the main concern of Megarry J in Coco v
Clark. In that case, Megarry J commented that:'
22
119 Earl Spencer v United Kingdom, supra n 14. Information about the claimant's medical
condition was disclosed by a confidant to the defendant. The defendant would likely
have been subjected to a duty of confidence and the use of a long lens to photograph
the claimant in the grounds of the clinic was an unauthorised use of the information.
120 Peck v United Kingdom, supra n 14, and see supra n 98.
121 See also R v Department of Health, ex p Source Informatics Ltd [2001] FSR 74 per
Simon Brown LJ at 85 that the central concern of the law in protecting information
of a personal nature is protecting privacy and that where a defendant is caught by a
duty of good faith, "the touchstone by which to judge the scope of his duty and
whether or not it has been fulfilled or breached is his own conscience, no more and
no less. One asks ... [whether] on the facts ... a reasonable pharmacist's conscience
[would] be troubled by the proposed use to be made of patients' prescriptions".
122 Supra n 80, at 48.
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At first sight, it seems that detriment ought to be present if equity is to
be induced to intervene; but I can conceive of cases where a plaintiff
might have substantial motives for seeking the aid of equity and yet
suffer nothing which could fairly be called detriment to him, as when
the confidential information shows him in a favourable light but gravely
injures some relation or friend of his whom he wishes to protect.
66 On the other hand, in Seager v Copydex Ltd,' Lord Denning MR
had less doubts, holding that the duty imposed is a duty not to take an
"unfair advantage" of the confidential information by using it to the
"prejudice" of the person who gave the information without obtaining his
consent.
67 At a theoretical plane, there might be something to be said for the
Seager approach. A holding that a claim for breach of confidence is
actionable per se, whilst consistent with a property theory, is arguably
inconsistent with the view that liability is rooted in equitable notions of
good faith and conscience. Further, given that the case law has already
confirmed the broad range of material that can be protected and that
liability for misuse can flow from subconscious misuse, the removal of a
detriment requirement appears to argue for a more proprietary basis for
intervention. And yet the cases do not support a property approach.
Alternatively, might it be said that the reality is that the two approaches
can be squared through a broad flexible approach to the meaning of
detriment? This is especially important in the area of personal
confidential information given the role that the action has acquired in
safeguarding privacy interests. Once again, the developments here predate
the Human Rights Act 1998. Thus, in AG v Guardian Newspapers,
Lord Keith of Kinkel, after commenting that in commercial cases
consequential detriment is usually present, proffered the view that:
1 
4
[I]n other cases there may be no financial detriment to the confider,
since the breach of confidence involves no more than an invasion of
personal privacy.... The right to personal privacy is clearly one which
the law should in this field seek to protect. ... [I]t is in the public
123 [1967] 1 WLR 923 ("Seager") at 931.
124 Supra n 84, at 255-256. See also John Hull, Commercial Secrecy: Law and Practice
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at para 3.01 who quotes from Attorney- General v
Newspaper Publishing Plc [1988] Ch 333 at 358 (per Sir John Donaldson MR) that:
Confidential information is like an ice cube. Give it to the party who undertakes
to keep it in his refrigerator and you still have an ice cube by the time the matter
comes to trial. ... Give it to the party who has no refrigerator or will not agree
to keep it in one, and by the time of the trial you just have a pool of water which
neither party wants. It is the inherently perishable nature of confidential
information which gives rise to unique problems.
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interest that confidences should be respected, and the encouragement of
such respect may in itself constitute a sufficient ground for recognising
and enforcing the obligation of confidence even where the confider can
point to no specific detriment to himself. ... So I would think it a
sufficient detriment to the confider that information given in
confidence is to be disclosed to persons whom he would prefer not to
know it, even though the disclosure would not be harmful to him in any
positive way.
68 Similarly, in the earlier case of X v y 2 which involved the identity
of certain doctors suffering from AIDS, Rose J held that Seager was not
authority for the proposition that detriment in the use of the information
was a necessary precondition to injunctive relief. It is clear now that in the
case of personal confidences, where privacy values have come to the fore,
it is only right that detriment in use should not be a precondition to the
award of injunctive relief. Alternatively, it might be said that the privacy
value underlying the action in these cases demands that the very loss of
confidentiality be regarded as sufficient to found the action.
69 Turning to the issue of monetary compensation for mental
distress, this has always been difficult in English law. The starting point is
the oft-stated view that disappointment, frustration, grief, anger and
anxiety are part and parcel of everyday life. Bringing these within the fold
of compensable harm might greatly increase the volume of litigation in a
way that may not be in the interests of society as a whole. This type of
harm is also said to be hard to prove, hard to assess and highly subjective
in nature. But even within common law, there are exceptions where
mental distress damages have been awarded. Take contract law, for
example. Whilst damages are not ordinarily awardable for mental distress,
they can be awarded where the consideration for the contract is
enjoyment and peace of mind. In such cases, a breach of contract causing
mental distress that directly undermines the consideration must be
compensable, for the breach affects the very consideration for the entry
into the agreement. Cases in point include Jarvis v Swan Tours Ltd
(holiday contract gone wrong),'26 Heywood v Wellers (solicitor fails to
prevent harassment)' and Diesen v Samson (photographer fails to turn
up at the wedding).' S Further, Prof Beatson points out that whilst these
are decisions where the sole object of the contract was to provide
enjoyment or peace of mind or to prevent distress, a more recent English
125 [1988] 2All ER 648.
126 [1973] QB 233.
127 [1976] QB 446.
128 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 49.
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case applied the exception where disappointment avoidance was merely
an important object of the contract."9
70 In this context, the first instance dictum in W v Egdell'3° that
mental distress damages were not awardable in an action for breach of
confidence is surprising. Not only is the connection between the breach
of a duty of confidentiality and the mental distress likely to be strong, the
equitable duty of confidentiality, especially in the case of personal
confidences, is directly concerned with peace of mind and security for the
confider.'"' If privacy interests are to be adequately shoehorned into the
law of confidence, damages for mental distress should be made available
where the information is of a personal nature. That this is now the
position can be seen from the decisions in Cornelius v De Taranto13 and
Douglas v Hello! Ltd' where mental distress damages were awarded.
Indeed, in appropriate cases, aggravated damages for mental distress (on
the basis of flagrant conduct) and exemplary damages (on the basis of
outrage) might also be available."'
(4) Public interest defence
71 If the touchstone of informational privacy concerns facts in
respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, a touchstone
of free speech has long been disclosure or use of information in the name
of the public interest. Indeed, free speech in the context of a specific
public interest is perhaps the most important area where freedom of
expression operates. Whilst public interest as a defence to an action for
breach of confidence has long been established, the European Convention
and the Human Rights Act 1998 have raised a number of significant
issues. Some of these have been examined already.
72 To begin with, there is the question touched on earlier as to
where the fulcrum for the balance between privacy and freedom of
expression is best placed. Procedurally, the earliest point of balance will
129 J Beatson, Anson's Law of Contract (Oxford University Press, 28th Ed, 2002) at p 594.
The case referred to is Farley v Skinner [2002] 2 AC 190.
130 [1990] Ch 359.
131 See also Cadbury Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods Ltd [2000] FSR 491. Binnie J recognised
that Canadian law supported a broad approach to detriment that would encompass
emotional and psychological distress arising from the disclosure of intimate
information.
132 [2001] EMLR 12.
133 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 29 (Lindsay J) and supra n 31 (CA).
134 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), supra n 29, at [272] and [275].
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be in respect of an application for an interlocutory injunction. Fears that
application of American Cyanamid principles might over-protect privacy
at the expense of freedom of expression have led some to call for a no-
prior-restraint rule. Whilst this has not been accepted, the UK Parliament
has in s 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 raised the threshold bar from "a
serious issue to be tried" to the somewhat higher standard that "the court
is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should
not be allowed".
73 Interlocutory relief aside, there remains the question as to
whether the balance between privacy and freedom of expression is an
issue that relates more to proportionality and the public interest defence
or whether it can affect the substantive requirement that the information
be confidential or private. The Campbell case well demonstrates how
tricky this question can be and how easy it is to conflate the question, is
there private information and the question as to whether the public
interest exception is applicable. This was the reason why Lord Nicholls
was skeptical about the value of incorporating a test for private
information based on some standard that the misuse would be highly
offensive. Such a formulation might bring into play considerations more
relevant to proportionality and the public interest exception.13  The
Campbell case concerned information said to fall into five categories:
(1) the fact of the claimant's drug addiction, (2) the fact the claimant was
receiving treatment, (3) the fact that the claimant was receiving treatment
at Narcotics Anonymous, (4) details of the treatment (how long she had
been undergoing treatment, how often she attended treatment sessions
etc) and (5) the visual portrayal (the covert photograph) of her leaving a
specific meeting.
74 In so far as the first two categories were concerned, the claimant
accepted that her false public statements that she did not take drugs
meant that she was precluded from claiming protection. What this meant,
according to Lord Nicholls, was that:' 6
By repeatedly making these assertions in public Miss Campbell could
no longer have a reasonable expectation that this aspect of her life
should be private. Public disclosure that, contrary to her assertions, she
did in fact take drugs and had a serious drug problem for which she was
being treated was not disclosure of private information. As the Court of
135 Supra n 39, at [22]. Outside of actions by the State, public interest is normally seen as
a defence on which the defendant bears the burden of proof. See Lion Laboratories
Ltd v Evans, supra n 64.
136 Supra n 39, at [24].
(2006)
18 SAcLJ 1 Privacy, Confidentiality and Freedom of Expression
Appeal noted, where a public figure chooses to present a false image and
make untrue pronouncements about his or her life, the press will
normally be entitled to put the record straight ...
75 The analysis of Lord Nicholls is important as he seems to treat
the public interest issue of "setting the record straight" as a matter which
went to the question as to whether categories (1) and (2) retained their
private (confidential) character. Indeed, similar issues arose with the
other categories. Given that the claimant could not prevent disclosure of
the first two categories, could it still be said that she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in respect of the other categories that provided
more detail? Does this imply that the burden falls on the claimant to
show that there is no public interest which justifies the breach in
question? Much may now depend on how confidential information of a
personal nature is to be characterised in England given underlying
privacy values. Is the requirement of confidentiality or privacy nothing
more than proof that the information is "relatively inaccessible to the
public'; or does the touchstone of a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
inevitably mean that matters relevant to proportionality and the public
interest come into play even at this early stage? In other words, even if the
"highly offensive" test is rejected, the application of a test based on
reasonable expectations of privacy might in any case open the door to
broader considerations on which the claimant will now bear the burden
of proof. The point is unclear since in relation to categories (3) and (4)
Lord Nicholls went on to say that he did not want to conclude the matter
solely on the point that the information had lost its private character. He
held that even if the information had retained its "private character", the
claim was bound to fail. The publication of the information was said to
represent (in the circumstances) a comparatively minor intrusion. This
had to be balanced against the fact that:13
[N] on-publication of this information would have robbed a legitimate
and sympathetic newspaper story of attendant detail which added
colour and conviction. This information was published in order to
demonstrate Miss Campbell's commitment to tackling her drug
problem. The balance [between privacy and freedom of expression]
ought not to be held at a point which would preclude, in this case, a
degree of journalistic latitude in respect of information published for
this purpose.
76 Another question that has arisen concerns the scope of the public
interest. Has s 12(4) of the Human Rights Act widened the defence to one
137 Id, at [28].
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where freedom of expression or freedom of the press per se becomes
determinative? Whilst some remarks of Lord Woolf CJ in A v B plc138
might support such a position, the better view is that this is not in fact the
position that Lord Woolf was taking.139 The court was simply setting out
general guidelines on the grant of interlocutory relief. The general
comments of Lord Woolf on the importance of a free press were more by
way of an explanation of why s 12(4) was needed and American
Cyanamid inappropriate than an assertion that freedom of press is a
trump card.
77 Then, there is the question of the degree of latitude a defendant is
to be allowed in determining the scope of the information to be
published to meet a proven public interest concern. This was the core of
the matter in the Campbell litigation. 0 Given that the claimant accepted
there was a real public interest to correct the false impression that had
been created (no involvement in drug consumption), did the public
interest defence justify revelation of the place where the claimant was
being treated, the details of the treatment and the visual information
contained in the photograph? Two approaches could be taken. The first
might be best described as the "pound of flesh" approach. This argues
that as a defence that justifies what would otherwise be an interference
with the claimant's rights, the defendant should limit himself to
information that is strictly necessary to meet the public interest concern.
The second might be termed the "reasonable penumbra" approach: the
defendant should be given some latitude to determine the range of facts
to be disclosed. Public interest issues usually arise in circumstances of
some urgency and at a time when the full picture may be unclear. So long
as the revealed facts are reasonably within the shadow of the public
interest that is asserted, the defence should prevail. The first view stresses
the importance of the right of privacy. The second tends to stress the
importance of freedom of expression. The reality is that a balanced
approach is what is needed. As discussed already, public interest issues
must be examined by reference to the actual facts and circumstances and
balanced against any specific arguments that the claimant may have to
underscore the claim to privacy. In some cases, the balance may require a
stricter view of what is to be revealed. In other cases, the public interest
138 Supra n 45.
139 See para 40 of the main text above.
140 This is distinct from the point that in some cases the proven public interest can be
adequately protected by a more limited disclosure to relevant authorities such as the
police rather than to the world at large. See Francome v Mirror Group, supra n 65,
and X Pte Ltd v CDE, supra n 34.
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may be so important that the defendant must be given more latitude to
decide what facts should be revealed. In some cases, this might include
information that lends credibility to statements made by the defendant.
In the Campbell case, the minority felt that the public interest supported
disclosure of all five heads of information. 141 The majority, on the other
hand, felt that given that the information was of a medical nature and
given the public interest in encouraging individuals to seek and continue
with treatment, disclosure of categories (3), (4) and especially (5) was
unjustified.' 42 Does this mean that the majority and minority were
applying some different legal principles? This seems unlikely. The
difference is simply a difference in views as to where the appropriate
balance lay on the facts of the case. In some cases, the defendant may only
be able to establish a relatively weak public interest issue, such as an
assertion that a famous football star is perhaps not a good role model
141 For example, Lord Hoffmann in Campbell vMGNLtd, supra n 39, at [62] said that:
The practical exigencies of journalism demand that some latitude must be
given. Editorial decisions have to be made quickly and with less information
than is available to a court which afterwards reviews the matter at leisure.
And at [68]:
To answer that question one must assess the disclosures said to be objectionable
in the light of the disclosures conceded to be legitimate. One must then ask
whether the journalists exceeded the latitude which should be allowed to them
in presenting their story.
Also at [77]:
We value the freedom of the press but the press is a commercial enterprise and
can flourish only by selling newspapers. From a journalistic point of view,
photographs are an essential part of the story.
142 For example, Lord Hope in Campbell v MGN Ltd, id, at [113] said:
But decisions about publication of material that is private to the individual raise
issues that are not simply about presentation and editing. ... The tests which
the court must apply are the familiar ones. They are whether publication of the
material pursues a legitimate aim and whether the benefits that will be achieved
by its publication are proportionate to the harm that may be done by the
interference with the right to privacy. ... Any restriction of the right to freedom
of expression must be subjected to very close scrutiny. But so too must any
restriction of the right to respect for private life.
See also Baroness Hale at [ 152] that whilst the public interest justified publication of
the fact "that, contrary to her previous statements, Miss Campbell had been involved
with illegal drugs[,] [i]t also justified publication of the fact that she was trying to do
something about it by seeking treatment. It was not necessary for those purposes to
publish any further information, especially if this might jeopardise the continued
success of that treatment." Also Lord Carswell's view at [165] that "it tended to deter
her from continuing the treatment which was in her interest and also to inhibit other
persons attending the course from staying with it, when they might be concerned
that their participation might become public knowledge".
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because of addiction to alcohol.' In other cases, the public interest may
be far more weighty and urgent, such as information concerning a
possible act of terrorism. All this has to be balanced against any specific
points that might support or heighten the public interest in protecting
the claimant's assertion of privacy.
(5) The effect of an exclusive licence
78 It must not be thought that categorisation of information as
"private" or "commercial" is watertight. Overlaps can easily arise and in
this day and age of celebrities, endorsement rights and merchandising,
private information can easily possess real commercial value. In this
sense, information will often be hybrid in nature. Privacy exists to protect
an individual's right of informational autonomy: his feelings and
emotions and right to control the development of his personality. The
assertion of control does not detract from a claim to privacy even where
the method chosen to assert control is to license limited uses of private
information. Thus in the Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3),144 Lindsay J found
that an assertion of control through the grant of an exclusive licence was
not inconsistent with the desire to protect the confidentiality of the
wedding party. On appeal, Lord Phillips MR agreed, stating that:14
Recognition of the right of a celebrity to make money out of publicising
private information about himself, including his photographs on a
private occasion, breaks new ground. ... [But] [d] espite the comment of
Joshua Rozenberg in Privacy and the Press (2004), at p 228, we do not
see this as any reason to draw back. We see no reason in principle why
143 The question as to whether the fact that a person is a celebrity is in itself enough to
support a public interest in private facts is always controversial and difficult. Where a
public personality has been a party to misrepresentations on his private life such as
to create a false role model impression, public interest is easy to argue (although
problems of scope may still arise). Even where the claimant has not sought the
position of a role model, if he has courted publicity, this might open the door to a
public interest defence. But where a person has not courted publicity but acquires
fame because he is highly successful in his private work (for example a famous trial
lawyer), the public interest defence needs to be examined especially carefully. This is
not to say that the defence cannot arise - much will depend on the nature of the
information and whether there is a real public need to know. See generally A v B plc,
supra n 45. Note that in the Douglas litigation, no public interest defence was
asserted. The mere fact that the claimants were very well known and popular did not
mean that there was a public interest in making available unauthorised pictures of
the wedding party. This was especially so given that authorised pictures were soon to
be released.
144 Supra n 29.
145 Supra n 31, at [113]. Similarly under copyright law, an author may well enjoy certain
moral rights designed to protect his personality in respect of the work. These rights
exist alongside the usual commercial rights (reproduction, public performance, etc).
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equity should not protect the opportunity to profit from confidential
information about oneself in the same circumstances that it protects the
opportunity to profit from confidential information in the nature of a
trade secret.
79 That being so, what was the effect of the exclusive licence to
publish authorised photographs that had been granted by the Douglases
to OK! (the publisher of "OK!" magazine)? Whilst this important issue
goes beyond the scope of the present article, the following points arise.
First, an exclusive licence at the minimum protects the licensee from a
claim for infringement by the licensor. If OK! did not have a licence to
publish, it would in turn have been liable to the Douglases for breach of
confidence or privacy. Viewed this way, a licence, exclusive or not, is a
defence to any claim for infringement. Second, an exclusive licence does
not mean that the licensee is acquiring any positive rights to assert in
respect of the assigned material. An exclusive licence means that the
licensor will not grant the same licence over the same material to any
third party. If the Douglases had subsequently granted a licence to Hello!
Ltd, this would clearly have amounted to a very serious breach of the
licence terms. Whether or not an individual has a right of suit must
depend initially on whether he is the owner or co-owner of the
information.'46 Where an employee makes an invention in the course of
employment, the rights conferred by the law of confidence may well
belong to the employer.' In other cases, the rights may have been
acquired by an assignment. Where the assignment is express, no problems
arise. But where the agreement is silent, the usual problems of
interpretation arise. 14 An assignment of the right to sue would not have
been necessary to give business efficacy to the exclusive licensing contract
in the Douglas case. Indeed, the express terms required the Douglases to
initiate proceedings against any unlicensed third party who used any
photograph in connection with the wedding. No mention was made at all
146 Although as a co-owner it may be necessary to join in all the owners. That would not
have been a problem in the Douglas litigation. Note also that in the Court of Appeal,
supra n 31, Lord Phillips MR at [ 126] refused to accept that confidential information
is protected on a property basis. Ownership is used loosely here as a term indicating
a person who has sufficient standing or right to sue.
147 See, for example Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant [ 1965] 1 WLR 1293.
148 Lindsay J at the trial of the action found that it is common enough for trade secrets
to be bought and sold and that in commercial confidence cases the benefit of the
confidentiality is often shared with others. "The confidentiality of a trade secret, for
example, may be shared between, and be enforceable by, the inventor and the
manufacturer to whom he had granted licence for the secret to be turned to
account." Supra n 29, at [187]. The Court of Appeal found that prior cases relied on
could be distinguished. In particular, in 0 Mustad & Son v Dosen [1964] 1 WLR 109,
the plaintiff was a purchaser and not a mere licensee.
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of any right of OK! to bring an action.' On this basis, what claims could
the Douglases have mounted against the defendant for the breach of
privacy? No problem arises with the mental distress that was
consequential to the unauthorised publication. Equally, there was no
difficulty with the claim for the consequential economic loss that arose in
connection with reasonable efforts of mitigation."0 But, what of the huge
economic losses sustained by OK! calculated on a lost sales method of
assessment? These were not the losses of the Douglases. The latter
presumably had already been paid the Elm licence fee!'15
80 In any event, is there a case for saying that notwithstanding the
commercial relationship between the Douglases and OK!, the duty of
confidentiality owed by Hello! Ltd to the Douglases was inherently so
personal in nature as to render the right unassignable? Thus, one
commentator takes the view that the assignability of rights must depend
on the nature of the information itself. Rights in the nature of trade
secrets or business information are very different from personal secrets
where human dignity comes to the fore.'
V. Conclusion: The road ahead for Singapore and informational
privacy
81 Even without developing a new tort to protect privacy on the
basis of some high level principle of liability, it is clear that recent years
have seen considerable expansion of the range of actions in England that
149 Note that actions brought by OK! outside of the law of confidence using the
economic torts failed because of the finding that the defendant did not have the
intent to injure OK! as opposed to benefiting themselves.
150 These concerned the extra expenses incurred by the Douglases in expediting the
selection of authorised photographs to compete with the unauthorised publication.
151 Note that cll 14 and 15 of the licence agreement provided for a sharing between OK!
and the Douglases of any sum over Elm received by OK! from all sources from the
exploitation of the authorised article. If the Douglases could prove that the activities
of Hello! Ltd had affected this right, then, subject to applicable rules of causation and
remoteness, a further claim could have succeeded.
152 Hull, Commercial Secrecy: Law and Practice, supra n 124, at para 4.60 citing the view
of the Law Commission, Breach of Confidence (Report No 110, Cmnd 8388, 1981) at
para 6.86 that:
There will ... be other cases of information protected by an obligation of
confidence where, because of the personal nature of the information, the
obligation ... cannot be regarded as transferable property - for example, clearly
a patient should not be able to transfer the benefit of an obligation of
confidence owed to him by his doctor. Similar points arise in copyright law
where the highly personal nature of moral rights means that where these are
conferred on the author, they are unlikely to be made assignable.
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offer protection for different aspects of privacy. These include
improvements in respect of protection for spatial privacy through the
enactment of harassment laws,' improvement of rights of data subjects
in respect of use of personally identifiable information in databases1"4 and
improved rights against spam.1- Central to the privacy framework in the
UK is of course the Human Rights Act 1998 which has played such a key
role in opening up the action in equity to protect confidential
information so as to better safeguard informational privacy interests. At
the same time, freedom of expression and the public interest, especially in
the area of counter-terrorism activity, naturally demand and require
proper attention and balance. 156
82 Singapore is not of course bound by the European Convention.
Neither does she have legislation on privacy similar to the Human Rights
Act 1998. But this does not mean that privacy issues will not have an
impact on the development of right - either by the courts or even more
so by Parliament. Thus far, we have already seen the use in Singapore of
broad privacy-driven policy arguments to carve out a tentative common
law tort of harassment. Even if it is ultimately held that this is an area that
is better dealt with by Parliament, the question of providing better
control of harassment is unlikely to soon disappear.
83 Indeed in an increasingly crowded world, "protection" of
individual space (real or virtual) is arguably more rather than less
important. Long gone are the days when an individual wanting privacy
(spatial or informational) could simply march off into the wilderness. In
the physical world, the range of self-help options is limited. Even in
cyberspace, whilst spam filters, anti-spyware programs abound, a lot of
spam still gets through. As most Internet users know, new spyware
programs force users to engage in endless bouts of updating.
153 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c 40) (UK).
154 See now the Data Protection Act 1998 (c 29) (UK).
155 UK Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations (2003)
SI 2003/2426.
156 See Ian J Lloyd, Information Technology Law (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2004)
at para 3.46 that the EC Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
(2002/58/EC) as originally drafted provided individuals with extensive guarantees of
privacy in respect of data pertaining to electronic communications. But, following
the events of September 11, an amendment was allowed permitting retention of data
for limited periods on grounds, inter alia, national security, defence, public security,
detection of crime etc. Lloyd notes that even prior to the entry into force of the
Directive, this power has been extensively used in the UK.
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84 But this in turn does not mean that a new unitary cause of action
to protect all aspects of an individual's right to be left alone is necessary
or desirable. Such a blockbuster cause of action will have to be couched in
broad open-ended terms that may cause many more problems than it
solves. A pigeon-hole approach may be the best way forward rather than
the creation of a single blockbuster sledgehammer. If the problem
concerns spam, then legislation specifically targeting spam, with
appropriate checks and balances, can be considered. If the issue is control
of spyware, rather than use of the spyware issue to ground a new tort of
privacy, it may be better if specific legislation to deal with computer
misuse and unauthorised access was considered (or adapted). If the issue
is control of databases, especially electronic databases, then likewise, if
self-regulation is not working, Parliament can consider, in the light of the
experiences in other countries, the appropriate legislative framework.1" If
the issue concerns use of information acquired by closed-circuit
television, this can first be considered under the existing laws, including
the law of confidential information, and if the latter is found inadequate,
then legislative intervention considered.'8
85 What then of the law of confidence? Will or should there be a
turbocharging of the equitable tort so as to better protect private
information? The fact that the Singapore Constitution does not expressly
refer to a right of privacy does not mean that the value of privacy is
irrelevant as a policy factor, the Malcomson decision in Singapore being a
case in point.' If spatial and informational privacy, and its underlying
value of solitude, is seen as providing the foundation for human
individuality, the development of individual personality, the fostering of
self-improvement, the encouragement of a "daring to be different"
personality, then privacy is an essential part of human development. In
this sense, the value of privacy is already part of many of the fundamental
freedoms provided for in the Constitutions of many countries. From one
point of view, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly, protection of liberty can all be regarded as founded on a state
157 See also supra n 9.
158 See Wainwright v Home Office, supra n 15, at [33] where Lord Hoffmann rejects the
argument that cases such as Peck v United Kingdom, supra n 14, demonstrate a need
for a general tort of invasion of privacy. Lord Hoffmann felt that at best, Peck's case
demonstrates the need for a system of control for use of CCTV film that shows
greater sensitivity to the feelings of people who happen to be caught on camera.
159 Supra n 6.
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of privacy.' ° At this level, the twin galaxies of privacy and freedom of
expression are not on a collision course. They are part of the same team.
If the defendant asserts a right to freedom of expression, the plaintiff's
assertion of a right of privacy can be seen as part of the latter's claim to
his own freedom of expression. Of course, no freedom or right can be
absolute: as between individuals (including individuals and the State as in
the case of criminal investigation), conflicts will occur and a balance will
need to be found.
86 Beyond this, it is clear that from its very inception, the law of
confidential information has not been limited to commercial confidences.
It has been seen that many of the earliest cases in England were precisely
concerned with confidential private information. In fact, in Singapore,
one of the first reported cases on breach of confidence concerned, in part,
the unauthorised use of personally sensitive information.'6 ' The
requirement that information should possess the necessary quality of
confidence may be easily satisfied in many cases where the information is
of a personal nature. Even if the courts in Singapore do not adopt a test
based on whether a reasonable person would regard the information as
private, many items of personal information will be confidential simply
because they can be identified with sufficient precision and because the
information is not in fact readily accessible to the public. More difficult is
the question of personal information that has already been given public
exposure. In England, a reasonable person might, in some cases, still
regard such information as being private. As discussed above, private
information may prove far more resilient and resistant to publicity which
might otherwise be said to have an effect of placing the information into
the public domain. In England, the movement towards this new test is
informed by the duty to comply with Art 8 of the European Convention.
Singapore is not under such a duty and the question as to whether she
should do so is bound to give rise to many differing views. If Singapore
does decide to move in this area, then she will also be free to consider
developing a law on informational privacy along the lines of what has
happened or appears to be happening in the US, Australia and Canada.
Here, the litmus test is founded on a finding that the claimant enjoys a
reasonable expectation of privacy and that the intrusion or misuse will be
160 But see the views of Wacks, The Poverty of Privacy, supra n 20. Wacks argues that
privacy is too muddled and confused to be elevated into a general principle or basis
for liability. He argues that privacy is often confused with other rights such as
freedom of expression and freedom of association. Wacks, however, accepts that
privacy is concerned with personality and may have relevance as an underlying value.
161 XPte Ltd v CDE, supra n 34.
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considered to be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Perhaps this is
an area that is best left to Parliament. In the meantime, the settled law of
confidence should be applied to determine whether any item of personal
information is in fact confidential information.
87 On the question of an obligation of confidence, the key question
is whether there is any retained requirement of a pre-existing relationship
between the parties to generate a duty of confidentiality. Retention of
such a requirement would severely limit the role of the law of confidence
in the area of invasion of informational privacy. Whilst the matter is not
free of all doubt, there appears no reason why the Singapore courts could
not take the view that equity has developed the action such that a duty of
confidence is imposed whenever the defendant receives or takes
confidential information which he knows or ought to know is
confidential. At the very least, equity should be able to intervene where
improper or reprehensible means have been used by the defendant.
88 On the question of detriment, even without the European
Convention, a good case can be made in support of a power to award
damages for mental distress - at least where the confidential information
is of a personal nature. If these are available in appropriate cases in
contract law, it will be strange, to say the least, to hold that mental distress
damages are not available in actions concerning confidential personal
information. Legislation should not be necessary to achieve this as it is
well within the capacity of the common law and equity to develop
principles on an incremental case-by-case basis.
89 Finally, on the public interest defence, the recent English cases
demonstrate that this is the main battleground for resolving the
competition between privacy and freedom of expression. The point has
already been made that the need to balance public interest factors in
favour of the unauthorised use against public interest factors in
maintaining confidentiality is of course not new. The defence of public
interest has long ceased to be tied down to specific areas such as serious
criminal misconduct or to some limited iniquity rule. There is of course
no question of the Singapore courts having to give presumptive priority
to either privacy or freedom of expression. Instead, what is already
permitted is a free ranging enquiry on the facts of each case.'62 What is
more important is whether there needs to be a shift in the focal point for
162 See Woodward v Hutchins, supra n 37, for an early English case (Lord Denning MR)
recognising a public interest to correct false impressions created by pop stars.
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the enquiry. Should there be a toughening up of the procedural rules
relating to the granting of interlocutory injunctions so that a higher
degree of assurance is required where the defendant raises a public
interest defence? Is there, as seems probable, sufficient flexibility already
in the American Cyanamid rules to achieve this on a case-by-case basis?
Should there be a factoring of issues of proportionality (reasonable
expectations or offensiveness) into the question as to whether the
information retains its quality of confidentiality or privacy? Much will
depend on whether the action in equity is to be expanded to include
private information that goes beyond confidential information
(information that is not readily accessible to the public). If the action to
protect confidential information remains limited to information that is
confidential in the normal way, then it is perhaps best to leave the
balancing of public interest to the established defence of public interest.
These are the questions that doubtless will arise for consideration in the
near future.
